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INTRODUCTION

There was a time in our national history when religious bigotry so
infused our state constitutions, statutes, and common law as to bar some
witnesses from testifying in court based solely on their religious beliefs.1
As a federal court formulated the rule in 1916: "a person who does not
of truth and the avenger of falsehood
believe in a God who is the rewarder
2
cannot be permitted to testify."
* Professor, Drake University Law School.
1. Allan W. Vestal, The Lingering Bigotry of State Constitution Religious Tests, 15 U.
MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 55, 70-84 (2015). In this discussion the term
"religious belief' includes both belief and non-belief on religious matters. I decline to engage in
the clever but wholly disingenuous distinction that would exclude atheists and agnostics from
legal protections of "religious belief."
2. United States v. Miller, 236 F. 798, 799 (W.D. Wash., 1916). In Miller the prosecution
called "Mr. Kirkland." The defendant objected to Kirkland's testimony "on the ground that he
does not believe in the existence of a God, who is the rewarder of truth and the avenger of
falsehood..." Id. at 798. At a hearing on the motion to exclude, Kirkland was interrogated as to
his beliefs on matters of religion:
A: "1 believe there is a creator, a cause for all that we see and all that we hear."
443
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The oath by which witnesses qualified to testify was the mechanism
of their exclusion. Treated the same as "persons deficient in
understanding"-including witnesses who were "hopelessly an idiot, or
maniac, or only occasionally insane, as, a lunatic;" "intoxicated;" 3 the
"deaf and dumb;" 4 and children'-atheists, agnostics, and certain
religious minorities were said to be "insensible to the obligations of an
oath from defect of religious sentiment and belief," and were deemed
incompetent to testify. 6 As one evidence treatise observed, when judges
and juries were presented such witnesses-otherwise competent and with
relevant testimony-"[t]hey held up their horrified hands and refused to
7
listen to such testimony as the witness might offer."
Our society evolved beyond such bigotry. Over time, bars to
testimonial competency based on religious belief were eliminated.8
Beginning with the Iowa and New York Constitutions of 1846, twenty-

one states adopted constitutional prohibitions on religious tests for
testimonial competency. 9 There were eleven states that adopted statutory
provisions to the same effect, and an additional eight states that rejected

Q: "You do not believe that there is a God who rewards truth and avenges
falsehood?"
A: "I think a man gets all his punishment in this world, while he is here. ..
Q: "As a matter of fact, your belief is that the punishment you receive in this
world comes from yourself, and from the men in the world."
A: "Yes."
Q: "And not from God?"
A: "No; I don't think it comes from God ...I think I could tell the truth if I
never took an oath."
Id. at 799. On the basis of his religious beliefs, Kirkland was not allowed to testify. Id. at 801.
3.

SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 409, § 365 (Boston, Little,

Brown & Co. 1842).
4. GREENLEAF, supra note 3, at 410, § 366 (noting that the established "presumption of
law they are idiots" had become rebuttable).
5. Id.at 410-11,§411,§367.
6. Id. at 412-13, § 413, § 368 (noting requirement that witness believe "in the existence
of an omniscient Supreme Being, who is 'the rewarder of truth and avenger of falsehood...'
(citing Omychund v. Barker, 26 Eng. Rep. 15 (1744))).
7.

5 JAMES M. HENDERSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL CASES

BASED UPON THE WORK OF BuRg W. JONES (San Francisco, 1926), v.4. at 3910 n.8, § 2089 (2d ed.

1926).
8. Vestal, supra note 1, at 73-77. Dean Emeritus Eugene Milhizer of Ave Maria School
of Law notes this history in his work on oaths. Eugene R. Milhizer, So Help Me Allah: An
Historicaland PrudentialAnalysis of Oaths as Applied to the Current Controversy of the Bible
and Quran in Oath Practicesin America, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 24-33 (2009).
9. Vestal, supra note 1, at 75-76 (Constitutions of Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Texas, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming).
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such tests as a matter of common law.10 Although two states, Arkansas
and Maryland, adopted constitutional testimonial exclusions based on
religious belief-and retain them even today"- such bars to testimonial
competency are no longer enforceable. 12 Lack of belief in the rewarder
of truth and avenger of falsehood no longer renders a witness
incompetent.
Eliminating the competency exclusions did not end testimonial
discrimination based on religious belief. Well into the twentieth century,
after state constitutional and statutory changes and the evolution of the
common law had overturned competency bars to testimony by atheists,
agnostics, and religious minorities, some courts still permitted challenges
to testimonial credibility based solely on religious belief.' 3 As with
competency bars, we evolved beyond such bigotry. Eventually, such
credibility challenges were prohibited in all jurisdictions.14 Lack of belief
in the rewarder of truth and avenger of falsehood no longer opens a
I
witness to attacks on credibility.
But today, although testimonial incompetency based on religious"
belief is a thing of the past and frontal challenges to testimonial credibility
10. Id.at 76.
11. ARK. CONST. of 1874, art. XIX, § I ("No person who denies the being of a God shall
•.. be competent to testify as a witness in any court."); MD. CONST. of 1867, Declaration of Rights,
art. XXXVI.
[36 ("no] person otherwise competent shall be deemed incompetent as a
witness or juror on account of his religious belief, provided that he believes
in the existence of God, and that under His dispensation such person will be
held morally accountable for his acts, and will be rewarded or punished
therefor either in this world or the world to come.
Id. The Maryland religious test for jurors was declared unconstitutional only fifty years ago.
Schowgurow v. State, 213 A.2d 475 (Md. 1965); State v. Madison, 213 A.2d 880 (Md. 1965).
12. Vestal, supra note 1, at 73-77. Rule 601 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides a
general assumption of witness competency that abolished competency bars based on religious
belief or opinion. FED. R. EvID. 601 ("Every person is competent to be a witness unless these rules
provide otherwise.").
13. In upholding the treason conviction of Mildred Gillars, the Maine native who, as "Axis
Sally," assisted the Nazis against the United States in WWII, the District of Columbia Circuit in
1950 indicated that a witness' atheism went to credibility, not competence. Gillars v. United
States, 182 F.2d 962, 966, 970, 983 84 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
14. Vestal, supra note 1, at 84-85 (noting FED. R. EVID. 610 ("Evidence of a witness'
religious beliefs or opinions is not admissible to attack or support the witness' credibility.") and
states evidentiary rules which reach the same result). Three states-Arizona, Oregon, and
Washington-have constitutional prohibitions on inquiries into religious belief to challenge
§ 12; OR. CONST. of 1859, art. 1, § 6; WASH. CONST. of
credibility. ARIZ. CONST. of 1912, art. I1,
1889, art. 1,§ 11. With the adoption of FED. R. EVID. 610 and its progeny the universal modem
rule is that "[e]vidence"Evidence of a witness' religious beliefs or opinions is not admissible to
attack or support the witness' credibility." FED. R. EVID. 610. All of the states have rules that
either track FED. R. EvID. 610 or achieve the same result. Vestal, supra note 1, at 85 n. 153.
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based on religious belief are not allowed, some jurisdictions continue to
discriminate in the testimonial setting based on religious belief. Once
again, the witness oath is the mechanism of discriminatory treatment.
This is seen in three ways.
First, although frontal credibility challenges based on religious belief
have been eliminated, our oath and affirmation practices allow religious
prejudice to improperly influence credibility determinations.
Second, although we have adopted well-meaning accommodations of
varying religious beliefs, the oath and affirmation practices of some states
improperly grant preferential status to some religious communities over
others, and impinge on the religious free exercise of some witnesses.
Third, the oath and affirmation practices of some states unnecessarily
conflict with the privacy interests of witnesses.
The nation has evolved a great deal since witnesses were excluded or
had their credibility challenged based on religious belief. It is time to
complete that evolution either by reforming our witness oath and
affirmation practices to remove the last vestiges of religious prejudice, or
by eliminating witness oaths altogether.
This discussion starts with a brief inventory of the state provisions,
constitutional, statutory, and rule-based, governing witness oaths and
affirmations. We then turn to the credibility problem. We conclude with
an analysis of two alternatives for the final evolutionary reform of witness
oaths and affirmations.
I. STATE

WITNESS OATHS AND AFFIRMATION PROVISIONS

The history of witness oaths is one of prejudice and exclusion. For
half a millennium, from the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215 to Omychund
v. Barker in 1745, the witness oath was the mechanism by which all non5
Christians were deemed unworthy of belief and barred from testifying.'
After 1745, for a century in England, and for at least a century and a half
in parts of the United States, the witness oath was the mechanism by
which disfavored religious groups, agnostics, and atheists were deemed
unworthy of belief and barred from testifying. 16
The language of some state provisions on testimonial oaths and
15. Vestal, supra note 1, at 71-73. Dean Milhizer's characterizations, that the exclusion of
all non-Christian witnesses represented only a "rather narrow view of who could swear oaths,"
and that the post-Omychund exclusion of members of some disfavored religions, agnostics, and
atheists represented "greater multicultural tolerance," might be seen as somewhat saccharine.
Milhizer, supranote 8, at 19.
16. Vestal, supra note 1, at 73-77; United States v. Miller, 236 F. 798, 799 (W.D. Wash.
1916). Dean Milhizer's characterization is merely that, by virtue of the exclusion of adherents of
disfavored religions, agnostics, and atheists, "Christians would enjoy a favored status in the oath
taking regime..." Milhizer, supra note 8, at 20.
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affirmations is redolent of that prejudiced and exclusionary past. 17 For
example, the statutory deity of Illinois is declared to be the "ever-living
God," 18 while the statutory God of North Carolina is "the omniscient
witness of truth and the just and omnipotent avenger of falsehood," to
whom the witness "shall answer ...at the great day of judgment, when

the secrets of all hearts shall be known."1 9 The official God of
Pennsylvania is "Almighty God, the searcher of all hearts" to whom the
20
person taking the oath promises to "answer ...at the last great day."

the searcher
Just to the north, Delaware's deity is "the ever living God,
21
of all hearts" who will be answered to "at the Great Day."
Some of the rituals associated with witness oaths are reminiscent of
our discriminatory heritage. North Carolina thus requires "the party to be
sworn to lay his hand upon the Holy Scriptures, in token of his
engagement to speak the truth and in further token that, if he should
swerve from the truth, he may be justly deprived of all the blessings of
that holy book and made liable to that vengeance which he has imprecated
on his own head.",22 If the party swearing the oath is "conscientiously
scrupulous" of taking the oath while touching the Holy Scriptures, North
Carolina provides an alternative:
When the person to be sworn shall be conscientiously scrupulous
of taking a book oath in manner aforesaid, he shall be excused from
laying hands upon, or touching the Holy Gospel; and the oath
required shall be administered in the following manner, namely:
He shall stand with his right hand lifted up towards heaven, in
token of his solemn appeal to the Supreme God, and also in token
that if he should swerve from the truth he would draw down the
vengeance of heaven upon his head, and shall introduce the
intended oath with these words, namely: I, A.B., do appeal to God,
as a witness of the truth and the avenger of falsehood, as I shall
answer the same at the great day of judgment, when the secrets of

17. The state law of testimonial oaths and affirmations is almost exclusively found in their
statutes and rules, not in their constitutions. Only seven states have constitutional provisions on
oaths and affirmations that appear to apply to testimonial oaths and affirmations. All are
provisions calling for the form or administering an oath or affirmation to be such as will be
consistent with and bind the conscience of the person taking the oath or giving the affirmation.
None is limited or narrowly applicable only to testimonial oaths and affirmations. Infra app. A,
items 1-7. In contrast, 47 states have state constitution oath of office provisions, Infra app. B,
items 2-48.
18. See infra app. B, item 14a.
19. See infra app. B, item 34a.
20. See infra app. B, item 39a.
21. See infra app. B, item 9a.
22. See infra app. B, item 34a.
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all hearts shall be known (etc., as the words of the oath may be). a3
But if one looks to the substance of the broad range of the oath and
affirmation provisions and not simply to the discriminatory history of
witness oaths in general and to the quaint language and ceremonies of a
few statutes, it can be argued that these rules are in the process of evolving
toward compatibility with religious pluralism. There is broad agreement
among the states as to the underlying policy and basic structure of the
way in which witnesses are qualified to testify. All fifty states provide for
both a religious-based oath and an alternative affirmation.2 4 There are
variations in wording, but forty-four of the states provide that the mode
of administering the oath or affirmation should be one essentially
calculated to awaken the conscience of the witness and impress upon the
witness the duty to tell the truth.25
The picture is further complicated because the universe of state
testimonial oath and affirmation provisions is less uniform than might
appear at first review, and courts have overridden some statutory oath and
affirmation provisions based on constitutional and common law
considerations.
As to uniformity, some of the common statutory provisions on
testimonial oaths and affirmations entered the various state statutes as
part of larger bodies of rules on broader topics. Thus many states have
adopted rules of civil procedure based on the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, including the oath or affirmation language of Rule 43(b):
"When these rules require an oath, a solemn affirmation suffices." 26 And
23. See infra app. B, item 34. In a concession to religious liberty, if the individual "shall
have conscientious scruples against taking an oath in the manner prescribed . . . he shall be
permitted to be affirmed." Id. ("In all cases the words of the affirmation shall be the same as the
words of the prescribed oath, except that the word 'affirm' shall be substituted for the word
'swear' and the words 'so help me God' shall be deleted."). The statute does not specify the
ceremony with which the affirmation is done. Presumably the party making an affirmation in
North Carolina is not required "to lay his hand upon the Holy Scriptures" as in the first option, or
to "stand with his right hand lifted up towards heaven, in token of his solemn appeal to the
Supreme God," as in the second.
24. See infra app. B, items 2a, 2b, 3a, 3b, 4a, 4b, 5b, 5c, 6b, 7a, 7b, 8b, 9b, 9c, 10b, Ila,
I Ib, 12a, 12b, 13a, 13b, 14a, 14b, 15b, 16a, 17a, 18a, 18b, 19a, 19b, 20b, 20c, 21a, 21b, 22a, 22b,
22c, 23a, 23b, 24a, 24b, 24c, 25a, 25b, 26a, 27a, 27b, 27c, 28a, 29a, 29b, 29c, 30a, 30b, 31a, 32a,
32c, 33a, 34a, 34b, 35a, 35b, 36a, 37a, 37c, 38a, 39a, 39b, 39c, 40a, 40b, 41a, 41b, 42a, 42b, 43a,
44a, 45b, 46a, 46b, 47a, 47b, 48a, 48b, 49a, 50a, 51a & 5lb.
25. See infra app. B, items 2a, 2b, 3b, 4a, 4b, 5a, 5c, 6a, 7b, 8b, 9a, 9c, Ila, lib, 12b, 13b,
14b, 15a, 15b, 16a, 18b, 19a, 19c, 20a, 21b, 22c, 23b, 24c, 25b, 27c, 28b, 30a, 30b, 32c, 33a, 34b,
35b, 36a, 37c, 38a, 39c, 41b, 42b, 43a, 44a, 45b, 46b, 47b, 48b, 49b, 50a & Sb.
26. FED. R. CIV. P. 43(b). In the original, 1938 version of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, this rule appeared as FED. R. Civ. P. Rule 44(d) (1938): "Affirmation in Lieu of Oath.
Whenever under these rules an oath is required to be taken, a solemn affirmation may be accepted
in lieu thereof" In the current version, the rule appears as Rule 43(b): "Affirmation Instead of an
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many states have adopted rules of evidence based on the Federal Rules
of Evidence, including the oath or affirmation language of Rule 603:
"Before testifying, a witness must give an oath or affirmation to testify
truthfully. It must be2 7in a form designed to impress that duty on the
witness' conscience.,
Often, states that adopted oath and affirmation language included in
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence
did not at the same time revise their pre-existing idiosyncratic oath and
affirmation provisions to conform to the newly adopted language. In
some jurisdictions, the statutory and rules provisions governing
testimonial oaths and affirmations are internally inconsistent.28
As to the constitution and common law, courts have supplanted
statutory oath and affirmation provisions based on constitutional 29 and
common law 30 considerations. It may be that we are not as far down the
evolutionary path as the broad brushstrokes would suggest. For example,
eighteen states retain threshold tests for witnesses who wish to affirm and
not swear. 31 Only a few states affirmatively make the affirmation form
Oath. When these rules require an oath, a solemn affirmation suffices."
27. FED. R. EVID. 603. The various state enactments of FED. R. EVID. 603 follow two
versions of the rule. Prior to 2011, Rule 603 read: "Before testifying, every witness shall be
required to declare that the witness will testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered in
a form calculated to awaken the witness' conscience and impress the witness' mind with the duty
to do so." In 2011, Rule 603 was amended for stylistic consistency to read as set forth in the text.
28. For example, Minnesota adopted both FED. R. Civ. P. 43(b) (in MINN. R. Civ. P. 43.04)
and FED. R. EVID. 603 (in MINN. R. EVID. 603). But Minnesota did not alter its pre-existing
statutory provision on testimonial oaths and affirmations to conform to the new rules, and the
statutory form is potentially inconsistent with the new provisions in that it specifies a narrow form
of oath which may as to some witnesses not be "in a form calculated to awaken the witness'
conscience and impress the witness' mind with the duty to do so," and it makes the alternative
affirmation available only to witnesses who "claim religious scruples against taking the" oath.
MN. STAT. § 358.07 (2016).
29. Ferguson v. Commissioner, 921 F.2d 588, 589 (5th Cir. 1991) (free exercise guarantee
requires court to fashion accommodation when witness' sincerely held religious beliefs conflict
with oath and affirmation procedures); Society of Separationists, Inc. v. Herman, 939 F.2d 1207,
1219 (5th Cir. 1991) (when juror refuses to take statutory oath based on protected beliefs, judge
should either allow juror to withdraw or should fashion alternative "serious public commitment
to answer truthfully that does not transgress the prospect's sincerely held beliefs.").
30. United States v. Looper, 419 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1969)
If defendant's religious beliefs made repugnant or impossible to him an appeal
to God or the raising of a hand as part of an oath or affirmation.., all the district
judge need do is to make inquiry as to what form of oath or affirmation would
not offend defendant's religious beliefs but would give rise to a duty to speak the
truth.
United States v. Ward, 989 F.2d 1015, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992).
31. See infra app. B, items 5a, 8a, 9a, 14a, 17a, 18a, 22a, 23a, 24a, 30a, 34a, 37a, 42a, 46a,
47a, 48a, 50a & 5]a.
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available to every witness without any threshold showing. 32 There are
twenty-two states that mandate a form of oath, or a form of affirmation,
or both.3 3 There are fifteen states that mandate rituals for the oath or
affirmation, ranging from the simple to the baroque. 34 As we shall see in
the following discussions of the credibility problem, the free exercise
problem, and the privacy problem, each of these provisions creates
potential impediments to religious pluralism.
Finally, statutory and rules provisions on oaths and affirmations in
thirty-one states exist against the backdrop of constitutional prohibitions
against the state favoring one religion over another, such as the
Mississippi guarantee that "no preference shall be given by law to any
religious sect or mode of worship..."35
II. WITNESS

OATHS AND CREDIBILITY

In the late summer of 2011, Dr. Abbas Husain, a Merchantville, New
Jersey family practitioner, was a defendant in a sexual harassment claim
brought by Tomikia Davis, a former employee. 36 During the course of the
trial Abbas, who is of Indian descent but whose religion is not disclosed
in the reported decisions, was called to testify. 7 He raised his right hand
38
and spoke the oath but did not place his left hand directly on the Bible.
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found in favor of the plaintiff
and awarded her $12,500 in damages. 39 Thereafter, the judge had an ex
parte conversation with the jurors, and "one juror noted during that
discussion that she was surprised that the defendant had not placed his
hand on the Bible before he testified. ' ' 40 The judge disclosed the juror's
comment to counsel, but "took no steps to ascertain whether the juror's
observation improperly influenced the jury's verdict nor did he make a

32. See infra app. B, items 27a & 39a.
33. See id. items 5a, 6a, 7a, 8a, 9a, 9c, 10a, 14a, 17a, 20a, 23a, 24a, 26a, 27a, 29a, 29c, 30a,
32a, 32b, 34a, 38a, 42a, 45a, 46a& 50a.
34. Nine states require raising a hand. Id. items 8a, 14a, 20a, 22a, 23a, 30a, 38a, 50a & 5la.
Two states require raising a hand or placing a hand on the Bible. Id. items 17a & 39a. Four statesArkansas, Delaware, North Carolina, and Virginia-have oath and affirmation provisions that are
much more complicated and much less compatible with religious pluralism. Id. items 5a, 9a, 34a
& 47a.
35. Infra app. C, items 1-31. The Mississippi provision is item 15.
36. Davis v. Husain, 2013 WL 949496 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013); Davis v. Husain,
106 A.3d 438 (N.J. 2014).
37. Davis, 2013 WL 949496, at *2, *6.
38. Davis, 106 A.3d at 441.
39. Davis, 2013 WL 949496, at *2; *5; Davis, 106 A.3d at 441.
40. Davis, 106 A.3d at 441; Davis, 2013 WL 949496, at *2, *5. One juror commented that
Husain had not touched the Bible when he took the oath before testifying."
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record with respect to the incident.",4 1 Abbas appealed, asserting error in
the trial court "failing to declare a mistrial on the basis of the juror's
comment about Husain and the Bible." 42 Abbas represented that his
belief that the left hand should never
action was based on his "religious
43
book.,
holy
a
on
be placed
The intermediate appellate court majority declined to order a new
trial, but the dissent spoke of "information from a juror that suggested she
may have assessed defendant's credibility on an irrelevant factor,
defendant's apparent unwillingness to place his hand on the Bible when
swearing to tell the truth.",44 The dissent observed:
There is no doubt that defendant was properly sworn.
Notwithstanding, we interpret . . . that this juror may have
mistakenly thought defendant's reticence when confronted with a
Bible was a sign of unwillingness to tell the truth... there is no
way of dismissing the possibility that the jury may have decided
the credibility contest in favor of plaintiff by relying 45on a
circumstance that had no bearing on defendant's credibility.
The New Jersey Supreme Court, having declared that "[w]e are
reluctant to engage in a presumption of prejudice under these
circumstances," nevertheless reversed and remanded for further
into the juror's observation and the effect,
proceedings to allow an inquiry
46
verdict.
jury
the
on
if any,
The case of Abbas Husain illustrates the credibility problem caused
by some contemporary oath and affirmation procedures. Although the
plaintiff could not have frontally challenged his credibility based on his
religious beliefs, New Jersey's oath and affirmation practices made it
possible for religious prejudice
to improperly influence the credibility
47
determination of a juror.
41. Davis, 2013 WL 949496, at *9, *24; Davis, 106 A.3d at 448.
42. Davis, 2013 WL 949496, at *7 (N.J. App., 2013); Davis v. Husain, 106 A.3d at 438.
43. Davis, 106 A.3d at 441 n.1. Dr. Husain also ascribed his action in not touching the
Bible to "his cultural upbringing was that the left hand should not be placed on holy books," and
represented that "because the courtroom had a Bible and a Koran, he was confused and not sure
which was being offered to him." Davis, 2013 WL 949496, at *3, *22 n.3
44. Davis, 2013 WL 949496, at *32 (Fisher, P.J.A.D., dissenting).
45. Id. at *32 33.
46. Davis, 106 A.3d at 448-49.
47. The record in the Davis case leaves open two possible inappropriate influences on the
credibility determination from the oath ceremony. The first is that the juror might have taken Dr.
Husain's unwillingness to touch the Bible as an indication that he was not a Christian, allowing
an adverse credibility determination based on religious prejudice. The second is that the juror
might have taken Dr. Husain's unwillingness to touch the Bible as an indication that he was not
telling the truth, allowing an adverse credibility determination based on religious belief.
Contemporaneous reports support the religious prejudice interpretation. Brent Johnson, N.J.
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The evolution from prejudice to fair treatment with respect to witness
competency and credibility was based on an understanding that religious
belief is not a valid predictor of competence or credibility, and a concern
that some finders of fact would48 allow religious prejudice to influence
their credibility determinations.
But removing competency bars and credibility challenges based on a
witness' religious beliefs did not completely eliminate the possibility of
discrimination against witnesses based on religion. Any time the finder
of fact is aware of the religious beliefs of a witness there is a possibility
of prejudice influencing the credibility determination.
Of course, as a practical matter it may be unavoidable that some
credibility determinations are open to be influenced by religious
prejudice. Some witnesses may be religiously identifiable by their dress
or appearance, by their names or patterns of speech. But having religious
prejudice influence credibility determinations can be avoided where the
witness' religion is disclosed only by the manner in which the witness is
qualified to testify.
In a sense, this problem is ironic. The oath that once excluded all nonChristians and then excluded disfavored religious minorities and all nonbelievers, has come back to open the door to further religious prejudice
because of well-meaning attempts to accommodate different religious
beliefs. Take, for example, the witness-belief accommodation clause of
the Federal Rules of Evidence. The applicable rule starts by requiring that
a witness be qualified by giving an oath or affirmation. 49 It then sets the
predicate for accommodation: "It [the oath or affirmation] must be in a

Supreme Court bans judges from speaking with jurors after verdict, NJ.com, Dec. 24, 2014

(updated Dec. 29, 2014), http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2014/12/njsupreme-court bans
judges from speakingwithjurors after verdict.html ("there wasn't enough information to
decide whether the verdict was tainted by religious bias." "[A] new judge will consider ...
whether prejudice occurred..."). "[Husain's] attorney... said in oral arguments before the high
court in September that the trial took place in late 2011, just after the 10th anniversary of the Sept.
11 attacks. That, she said, may have caused the jury to discriminate against Husain."). Id. Jim
Walsh, High Court: Camco Judge's Meeting Improper, SOUTH JERSEY COURIER-POST (Dec. 23,

2014), http://www.courierpostonline.com/story/news/tocalsouth-jersey/201 4/12/23/high-courtcamco-judges-meeting-improper/20823483/ ("juries are not allowed to consider 'improper
information' during deliberations, including 'comments in the jury room (that) manifested
unlawful bigotry."). For our purposes it is sufficient that the oath ceremony allowed the first
possibility.
48. Brink v. Stratton, 68 N.E. 148, 148-53 (N.Y. 1903) (Cullen, J., concurring); Vestal,
supra note 1, at 86-90; see also Lucien J.Dhooge, Public Accommodation Statutes, Sexual
Orientationand Religious Liberty: FreeAccess or Free Exercise, 27 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
1, 34 (2016) (stating that neutrality concerns are raised when religious beliefs are not treated
similarly).
49. FED. R. EvID. 603 ("Before testifying, a witness must give an oath or affirmation to
testify truthfully.").
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form designed to impress that duty on the [witness'] conscience."50 The
rule is intended to provide flexibility in dealing with a variety of
witnesses, as the notes of the advisory committee rather undiplomatically
confirm: "[t]he rule is designed to afford the flexibility required in
atheists, conscientious objectors, mental
dealing with religious adults,
51
children."
and
defectives,
These accommodations suggest a commendable sensitivity to
variations in religious belief, and a commitment to religious pluralism.
But the variations in the oath or affirmation inherent in accommodation
mean that the trier of fact may gain information about a witness' religious
beliefs from the manner in which she is qualified. This in turn makes it
possible for the credibility determinations of jurors and judges to be
influenced by religious prejudice, a possibility illustrated by the case of
Abbas Husain.
Simply administering the oath or affirmation out of the presence of
the judge and jury could solve this problem. 52 In this way the ceremonial
importance of the oath or affirmation-to impress upon the witness the
importance of telling the truth-could be maintained and no alterations
of any oath or affirmation forms would be required.
Simply moving the venue for oaths and affirmations would solve the
credibility problem. It would not solve either the preference and free
exercise problem, to which we now turn, or the privacy problem.
III. WITNESS

OATHS, PREFERENCE, AND FREE EXERCISE

In the winter of 2014, Rawda Musaitef was involved in a custody
dispute with her former husband, Abdul Musaitef, in a Philadelphia
family court.53 Rawda and Abdul are Muslims. During the course of the
trial Abdul was called to testify. He was qualified by placing his hand
upon the Bible and reciting the Pennsylvania statutory oath.5 4 When
Rawda took the stand she requested to be sworn by taking an oath on a
Quran instead of a Bible.5 5 Abdul objected and the court held a hearing
50. Id.
51. FED. R. EVID. 603, Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules.
52. Depending on the jurisdiction, the oath or affirmation might be administered by a clerk
or by a judge other than the presiding judge. It is assumed that in order to insulate the witness
from any prejudice, the oath or affirmation would be administered out of the hearing of the judge
even in jury cases.
53. James W. Cushing, Christian Bible or Nothing, Philadelphia Family Court Says,
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Dec. 23, 2014), http://www.thelegalintelligencer.com/id=1202713

174626/Christian-Bible-or-Nothing-Philadelphia-Family-Court-Says.
54. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5901(a). It is reported that the father used the Christian Bible.
Cushing, supra note 53.

55.

Cushing, supra note 53.
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to consider arguments from opposing counsel.56 Pennsylvania gives
witnesses the right to affirm rather than swear an oath.5 7 But if a witness
wants to swear an oath, the Pennsylvania statute prescribes the form, one
that will conflict with some witness' religious opinions and beliefs.
Every witness, before giving any testimony shall take an oath in
the usual or common form, by laying the hand upon an open copy
of the Holy Bible, or by lifting up the right hand and pronouncing
or assenting to the following words: "I, A. B., do swear by
Almighty God, the searcher of all hearts, that I will
58
great day.",

. and that as I shall answer to God at the last

The arguments of the Musaitefparties illustrate several aspects of the
preference and free exercise problem. Abdul objected to letting Rawda
be sworn on the Quran, arguing that the Pennsylvania statute is clear;
Rawda could either swear the statutory oath on the Christian Bible or use
59
the non-religious affirmation.
Rawda's argument was framed in terms of religious liberty. She
argued that to be constitutional under the First Amendment, the
56. Id.
57. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5901(b) (1978) ("The affirmation may be administered in any
judicial proceeding instead of the oath, and shall have the same effect and consequences, and any
witness who desires to affirm shall be permitted to do so.").
58. Id.§ 5901(a). The section concludes with language that is indecipherable: "Which oath
so taken by persons who conscientiously refuse to take an oath in the common form shall be
deemed and taken in law to have the same effect as an oath taken in common form." Id.One
Pennsylvania commentator calls this final sentence "curious," and suggests that it might "imply
that the statute ought to be read expansively as it appears to allow another form, other than the
'common form,' to have the same effect as the common form." Cushing, supra note 53.
59. Abdul also argued that to permit Rawda to be sworn on the Quran would be a form of
witness intimidation:
The father first argued that the mother's request was a pretext for witness
intimidation. Evidently, the alleged implication from the mother was that the
father's Islamic faith included the belief that oaths taken on religious books
outside of Muslim belief would not bind the speaker to tell the truth. Therefore,
the witness intimidation was the mother's subtle suggestion that the father's use
of a Christian Bible instead of a Quran for his oath, as contrasted by her insistence
on using a Quran, indicated that the father was going to lie during his testimony.
Cushing, supra note 53. Abdul also observed that the Pennsylvania statute prohibits inquiry into
a witness' religious beliefs in order to challenge credibility, "so he cannot explore with her the
potential religious and/or other implications for using a Quran over a Bible for the purposes of
taking an oath at a hearing." Id. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5902(b) (1978) ("No witness shall be
questioned, in any judicial proceeding, concerning his religious belief; nor shall any evidence be
heard upon the subject, for the purpose of affecting either his competency or credibility.").
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Pennsylvania statute must be read broadly enough to permit the use of the
Quran instead of the Christian Bible. She noted the affirmation option is
for people who object to taking an oath or object to a religiously based
oath. Rawda argued that the "obvious purpose of the oath... is to impose
the significant nature of the proceedings on a witness and to ensure the
truth of testimony," and that the "way to impose the significant nature of
the proceedings onto a witness is to allow that witness to swear upon
something that witness respects and takes seriously, such as her preferred
religious text."'60 She observed: "[I]f Christians receive the benefit of, and
respect for, their religious beliefs when taking the oath on their Bible,
benefit
ought not other religionists, in this case Muslims, receive the same
'61
and respect and be permitted to take an oath on their Quran?
Rawda's constitutional argument was straightforward:
[U]nderstanding 42 Pa. C.S. Section 5901 as restricting oaths to
exclusively the Bible (or non-religious affirmation) is
unconstitutional. The mother pointed out that by allowing for the
use of the Bible but no other religious books for an oath,
Pennsylvania impermissibly favors Christianity over other
religions and, therefore, serves as an62unconstitutional endorsement
of Christianity over other religions.
This argument finds support in the anti-preference clause of the
be given by law
Pennsylvania constitution, that "no preference shall ever
63
to any religious establishments or modes of worship."
The court rejected Rawda's arguments, ruling that the Pennsylvania
statute had to be read literally to require either the statutory-form oath on
a Christian Bible or a non-religious affirmation. The court ruled that other
religious books, sacred to the witness' faith, could not be substituted.64
60. Cushing, supra note 53.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See infra app. C, item 24.
64. Cushing, supra note 53. Rawda Musaitef did not appeal the court's ruling. Telephone
interview with James W. Cushing, Associate, Faye Riva Cohen, P.C. (May 26, 2015). There are
indications that other Pennsylvania judges approach the form of the oath differently. Gabrielle
Banks, Truthfully, Our Court Oath is Elaborate, PiTT. POST-GAZETTE (Aug. 10, 2006),
http://www.post-gazette.com/frontpage/2006/08/I 0/Truthfully-our-court-oath-is-elaborat e.html.

Some local judges do not require the formal oath ...Most judges let staffers,
who know their preferences on most legal procedures, decide how to give the
oath. "If it's ajury trial, I try to keep it as flowery as they like it," said [one clerk].
In nonjury proceedings, "Iusually do the quick version, just to keep things going
quickly."
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The public reaction to Musaitef was sadly predictable. Rawda's request
to take an oath on the Quran was described as "an attempt to inject the
Quran and Sharia law in these American states," and "yet another
example of Muslims using our own laws to try and tear down our
65
system."
Rawda Musaitef faced the preference and free exercise problem
caused by some contemporary oath and affirmation procedures. Although
under Pennsylvania law she was free to affirm rather than swear an oath,
if she elected to swear an oath, she would have been forced to swear a
statutorily defined oath that is incompatible with her religious beliefs.
Rawda would have fared better had she lived in North Carolina and
not Pennsylvania. In 2003 Syidah Mateen, a Muslim, was to testify at a
domestic violence protective order hearing. 66 The North Carolina statute
provides that when swearing a witness:
Judges... shall.. . require the party to be sworn to lay his hand
upon the Holy Scriptures, in token of his engagement to speak the
truth and in further token that, if he should swerve from the truth,
he may be justly deprived of all the blessings of that holy book and
made liable to that vengeance which he has imprecated on his own
head.6 7
When faced with being sworn in with her hand upon a Bible, Syidah
asked to be sworn in with her hand on a Quran. 6 8 Her request was refused
and she elected to affirm instead.6 9
The ACLU of North Carolina and Syidah challenged the statute,
arguing in the alternative that either the term "Holy Scriptures" in the
statute meant the Bible and also other religious texts, including-but not
by way of limitation-the Quran, the Old Testament, and the BhagavadGita,7 ° or that if the term "Holy Scriptures" meant only the Bible, then
65. Leland Ivy, Muslim Wants to Swear Oathon Quran - Not Bible: Judge in Pennsylvania
Slaps Her Down!, JOE FOR AMERICA (Feb. 12, 2015), http://joeforamericacom/2015/02/muslim-

wants-swear-oath-quran-not-bible-judge-pennsylvaniaslaps/.
66.
67.
68.
69.

ACLU of N.C., Inc. v. State, 639 S.E.2d 136 (N.C. Ct. App., 2007).
See infra app. B, item 34a.
ACLUofN.C., 639 S.E.2d at 137.
Id. at 139.

70. Id. The ACLU based its argument that the term "Holy Scriptures" included texts other
than the Bible in part upon a 1985 amendment to the statute which substituted the term "Holy
Scriptures" for the term "Gospels." In the declaratory judgment (at 3), the court says "Plaintiffs
urge that the term 'the Holy scriptures' appearing in N.C Gen. Stat. § 11-2 should be interpreted
to include not just the Christian Bible, but other religious texts, including but not limited to the
Quran, the old Testament and the Bhagavad-Gita." See ACLU of N. Carolina, Marten v. North
Carolina Order, American Civil Liberties Union, at https://www.aclu.orgllegal-document/aclu-ncarolina-matten-v-north-carolina-order?redirect=-cpredirect/29873
[hereinafter Declaratory
Judgment]. The argument is perhaps diminished by the fact that the following section, allowing
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the statute violated the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise
Clause of the Federal Constitution
and the religious liberty guarantee of
71
the North Carolina constitution.
The North Carolina trial court judge declined to find that the statutory
term "Holy Scriptures" included religious texts other than the Bible, or to
find the North Carolina oath statute, so narrowly construed, to be
unconstitutional.7 2 Rather, looking to the 1856 North Carolina case of
right for witnesses to
Shaw v. Moore,73 the judge found a common-law 74
Bible.
the
than
other
texts
religious
using
be sworn
Shaw involved a probate matter in which the competency of one of
the witnesses to a will was challenged based on his religious beliefs. The
issue involved the witness' belief that God's judgment for lying would
be felt in this world and not the world to come:
Is a person who "believes in the obligation of an oath on the Bible;
who believes in God and Jesus Christ, and that God will punish in*
this world, all violators of his law, and that the sinner willinevitably be punished in this world for each and every sin
committed; but there will be no punishment after death, and that
will be happy and equal to the angels"-a
in another world all
75
competent witness?
Justice Richmond Mumford Pearson, writing for the Shaw court,
noted that the common-law rule required both a temporal and a religious
sanction for violation of the witness oath.76 He lauded the development

an alternative mode of taking the oath "[w]hen the person to be sworn shall be conscientiously
scrupulous of taking a book oath in manner aforesaid" provides "he shall be excused from laying
hands upon, or touching the Holy Gospel..." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 11-3 (2016).
71. ACLU ofN. C., 639 S.E.2d at 137 (citing N.C. CONT. art. 1, § 13 ("Religious liberty. All

persons have a natural and inalienable right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of
their own consciences, and no human authority shall, in any case whatever, control or interfere
with the rights of conscience.")). The North Carolina constitution does not contain a religious
preference clause. Id.
72. In the declaratory judgment (at 13) the court declines to declare the statute
unconstitutional, having already fashioned "a less drastic remedy." Declaratory Judgment, supra
note 71, at 13.

73. Shaw v. Moore, 49 N.C. 25 (N.C. 1856).
74. Declaratory Judgment, supra note 70.
75. Shaw, 49 N.C. at 26.
76. Id.
The law requires two guaranties of the truth of what a witness is about to state;
he must be in the fear of punishment by the laws of man, and he must also be in
the fear of punishment by the laws of God, if he states what is false; in other
words, there must be a temporal and also a religious sanction to his oath. In
reference to the first, no question is made; but it is insisted, that the religious
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of the common law:
One excellence of the common law is, that it works itselfpure, by
drawing from the fountain of reason, so that if errors creep into it,
upon reaons, which more enlarged views and a higher state of
enlightenment, growing out of the extension of commerce and
other causes, proves to be fallacious, they may be worked out by
subsequent decisions.77
Justice Pearson then gave as an example of such a common law
development, the evolution of the law beyond Lord Coke's opinion that
non-Christians were incompetent as witnesses: "All infidels are in law
perpetui inimici; for, between them, as with the devils, whose subjects
they be, and the Christian, there is perpetual hostility., 78 Justice Pearson's
characterization of Lord Coke's reasoning was sharp: "This reason, to say
the least of it, is narrow-minded, illiberal, bigoted and unsound., 79 He
traced the development of the common-law rule that conditioned
competency on a belief in a state of rewards and punishments, and
addressed the question of whether the rule required belief in afuture state
of rewards and punishments:
This position is not sustained by the reason of the thing, for, if we
divest ourselves of the prejudice growing out of preconceived
opinions as to what we supposed to be the true teaching of the
Bible, it is clear that, in reference to a religious sanction, there is
no ground for making a distinction between the fear of punishment
by the Supreme Being in this world, and the fear of punishment in
the world to come; both are based upon the sense of religion. ....
The rule of law
which requires a religious sanction, is satisfied in
80
either case.

The Shaw court rejected the argument that the North Carolina
statutory provision on oaths was intended to displace and narrow the
common law. "We think it manifest, by a perusal of the Statute that it was
not intended to alter any rule of law, but the sole object was to prescribe
forms, adapted to the religious belief of the general mass of the citizens,
for the sake of convenience and uniformity." 81 The opinion rejected as
sanction required, is the fear of punishment in a future state of existence.
Id.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.at 27.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 26-27.

81.

Id.at29.
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indecent the suggestion that the statute was intended to exclude witnesses
allowed under the common law:
We think it indecent to suppose that the Legislature intended in an
indirect and covert manner to alter a well-settled and unquestioned
rule of law, and in despite of the progress of the age, to throw the
country back upon the illiberal and intolerant rule which was
supposed to be the law in the time of bigotry... 82
Finally, the Shaw court allowed what would have been the outcome
had the Legislature so intended to narrow the rights of witnesses:
If it be admitted, for the sake of the argument, that . . . the
Legislature had the purpose of altering the common law, so as to
exclude Jews and infidels, who believe in a God, and Christians,
who do not believe in future rewards and punishments, from the
privilege of taking the oaths which are required to enable them to
testify as witnesses ... in other words, to degrade and persecute
them for "opinion's sake," then it is clear, that the statute, so far as
this purpose is involved, is void and of no effect, because it is in
direct contravention of the 19 sec. of the Declaration of Rights:
"That all men have a natural and unalienable right to worship
Almighty God according to the dictates of their own

consciences. "83
What guidance does Justice Pearson's opinion in Shaw provide as to
whether Syidah Mateen ought to have been able to swear her testimonial
oath on the Quran? As to the proposition that an oath of a Muslim witness
must be sworn on a Bible and not a Quran, one can paraphrase Justice
Pearson:
This position is not sustained by the reason of the thing, for, if we
divest ourselves of the prejudice growing out of preconceived
opinions as to what we supposed to be the true teaching of the
Bible, it is clear that, in reference to a religious sanction, there is
no ground for making a distinction between sanctions in one
Abrahamic religion and another; both are based upon the sense of
religion.... The rule of84law which requires a religious sanction, is
satisfied in either case.
As to the proposition that the oath statute was intended to displace and
82.

Id.at 30.

83.
84.

Id.
Id.
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narrow the common law, one need not even paraphrase Justice Pearson:
"We think it manifest, by a perusal of the Statute, that I was not intended
to alter any rule of law, but the sole object was to prescribe forms, adapted
to the religious belief of the general mass of the citizens, for the sake of
convenience and uniformity." 85 As the religious beliefs of the "general
mass of the citizens" have become more diverse, the forms prescribed
should follow.
Finally, if the Legislature did intend to exclude the use of religious
texts other than the Bible from use in testimonial oaths, the Shaw opinion
strongly suggests the outcome. To paraphrase:
If it be admitted, for the sake of the argument, that . . . the

Legislature had the purpose of excluding non-Christians from the
privilege of taking the oaths which are required to enable them to
testify as witnesses... in other words, to degrade and persecute
them for "opinion's sake," then it is clear, that the state, so far as
this purpose is involved, is void and of no effect, because it is in
direct contravention of the 19 sec. of the Declaration of Rights:
"That all men have a natural and unalienable right to worship
Almighty God according to the dictates of their own
consciences."86

It is, as Justice Pearson suggested in Shaw, that with "more enlarged
views and a higher state of enlightenment" we move beyond "narrowminded, illiberal, bigoted and unsound" reasoning. 87 One can imagine
Justice Pearson reading with approval the opinion of the Superior Court
Judge Paul Ridgeway, allowing religious texts other than the Bible to be
used for witness oaths in North Carolina:
The highest aim of every legal contest is the search for the truth.
To require pious and faithful practitioners of religions other than
Christianity to swear oaths in a form other than the form most
88
meaningful to them would be to thwart the search for the truth.
Rawda Musaitef would have fared even worse had she lived in Kansas
and not Pennsylvania. As in Pennsylvania, in Kansas every witness is
required to swear an oath or make an affirmation. 89 The statute provides
85.
86.

Id. at 29.
Id. at 30.

87.
88.

Id. at 27.
Judge Says Multiple Religious Texts Must Be Allowed for Swearing-in Proceedings,

ACLU.ORG (May 24, 2007), https://www.aclu.org/news/aclu-north-carolina-applauds-courtruling-preventin g-religious-discrimination-courtroom.
89. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-418 (2016). The oath or affirmation makes the penalties for
perjury applicable. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 54-105 (2016).
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the oath is to be taken "by laying the right hand upon the Holy Bible, or
by the uplifted right hand." 90 The Kansas statutory oath would have
offended Rawda's religious convictions, as did the statutory oath in
Pennsylvania.
Rawda's additional problem in Kansas would have come from how
one opts to make an affirmation. Under Pennsylvania law, any witness
can opt to make an affirmation in lieu of taking the statutory oath. 91 Not
so in Kansas, where the statute limits the affirmation option to "[a]ny
person having conscientious scruples against taking an oath .... ,92 This
accommodates Quakers, atheists, agnostics, and the like.
The problem is how the Kansas statute treats individuals such as
Rawda, who have deeply held religious beliefs that permit them to take
an oath but that are incompatible with the particular oath form specified
in the statute. Under the Kansas statute, she would not qualify to avoid
the oath, as she is not a "person having conscientious scruples against
taking an oath." 9 After all, her religion provides for oaths.94 But if she
does not qualify for the statutory exemption, the Kansas statute requires
her to make an oath which conflicts with her religious beliefs.
Faced with the Kansas statutes, what should Rawda do? Should she
violate her religion's prohibition on lying by saying that she has
conscientious scruples against taking an oath-thus allowing her to avoid
the statutory oath form which conflicts with her religious beliefs-when
in fact she does not? Or should she violate her religious beliefs by taking
the statutory oath? It is a difficult choice, one that we should not compel
any witness to make.
Nor under its own constitution is it a choice that Kansas can force a
witness to make. The same provision of the Kansas Bill of Rights which
guarantees that no person shall be rendered incompetent to testify on
account of religious belief also guarantees that no preference can be given
to one religion over another-exactly what the Kansas statutory oath
does:
The right to worship God according to the dictates of conscience
shall never be infringed.., nor any preference be given by law to
any religious establishment or mode of worship ... nor shall any
95

person be incompetent to testify on account of religious belief.

90.

91.
92.
Id. items
93.
94.
95.

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102 (2016).

See infra app. B, item 39a.
Infra app. B, item 17a. Seventeen additional states have a test for a witness to affirm.
5a, 8a, 9a, 14a, 18a, 22a, 23a, 24a, 30a, 34a, 37a, 42a, 46a, 47a, 48a, 50a & 51a.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 54-103 (2016); infra app. B, item 17a.
Milhizer, supra note 8, at 47-58.
KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights § 7.
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In Pennsylvania, Rawda Musaitef was faced with a simple preference
and free exercise problem-she was prevented from swearing an oath
compatible with her religious beliefs while others were allowed to swear
an oath compatible with their beliefs, although she could have affirmed.
In Kansas, she would have been faced with a heightened preference and
free exercise problem-she would have been forced to swear an oath
incompatible with her religious beliefs because she did not meet the test
for affirming. Either way, she would have been discriminated against
because of our incomplete evolution from our exclusionary past.
Surely it is inappropriate to allow some witnesses to swear an oath
consistent with their sincerely held religious beliefs while denying others
the same opportunity. Indeed, in the thirty-one states that have
constitutional guarantees against religious preferences, such differential
treatment ought to be held unconstitutional.96
The solution to the credibility problem-to administer oaths and
affirmations out of the presence of the judge and jury-does not address
the preference and free exercise problem. But it could be addressed by
simply letting witnesses who want to swear to a religious oath use
whatever form of oath is consistent with their religious beliefs and
opinions. Each witness would elect, without any predicate showing,
whether to take an oath or make an affirmation. Witnesses who elect to
take an oath would be able to specify the oath and the ritual, including
which writing-if any-would be used in the oath taking. Such a policy
could result in a range of oath forms and religious writings being used. 97
Such a system would be logistically complicated and inefficient, but it
would solve the preference and free exercise problem.
Dean Milhizer has made a proposal for the reform of witness oaths
which constitutes a different approach to the preference and free exercise
problem. 98 As a response to "the religious pluralism present within the
United States today,"9 9 he suggests the requirements for a modem

testimonial oath:
Given the religious diversity in contemporary America, an
96. See infra app. C, items 1-31.
97. Rather than use a common edition of the Bible, Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, and LDS,
witnesses might elect to use writings better aligned with their individual beliefs. Protestant
witnesses might use a Bible with thirty-nine Old Testament books and twenty-seven New
Testament books; Catholics a Bible with forty-six Old Testament books and twenty-seven New
Testament books. Jewish witnesses might use the Tanakh. LDS witnesses might use the
Authorized King James Bible (without the Apocrypha), the Book of Mormon, the Doctrine &
Covenants, and the Pearl of Great Price. Witnesses from the Islamic faith tradition would
presumably elect to use the Quran. Some Hindus might elect to use the Bhagavad Gita; Wiccans
might elect to use a pentacle in lieu of a writing.
98. Milhizer, supra note 8, at 58-71.
99. Id.at 58.
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effective oath must account for a variety of beliefs about the
identity and nature of God, consistent with present-day attitudes.
It must permit subjective and divergent understandings of God's
relationship to an oath and oath taker. It must accommodate
religious diversity, both as publicly expressed in the oath
ceremony and as privately held by individual oath takers. Finally,
it must retain substantive meaning while demonstrating procedural
agility. These are the needs and challenges of the modem oath. 00
Dean Milhizer proposes an oath form that contains "an explicit
reference to an undifferentiated God while prohibiting the use of any
artifacts." 101 He finds the use of a Bible, for Christians,10 2 and a Quran,
for Muslims, 103 is not required for the testimonial oath to be effective. He

makes a parallel assertion as to "other faith traditions and belief
systems"--"it is clear that the use of religious artifacts, while permissible
and in some cases even helpful, are not required for meaningful and
effective oaths and affirmations."' 1 4 And, he asserts, such an oath form
would be broadly acceptable:
Such a public, generic reference to the divine would not intrude
upon private conceptions of God, which can remain infinitely
personal to the oath taker. Christians can comfortably swear an
can
oath to God as God. So can Muslims. So too, presumably,
0 5
adherents of most monotheistic religious traditions.1

100. Jd.at 59.
101. Id.at 70.
102.

Id.at 62-63.
[T]he use of the Bible is not required ... while it is permissible, and perhaps
even desirable in certain instances to allow Christians to use the Bible in taking

an oath, it is not necessary for the purpose of binding a Christian in conscience
to tell the truth in court because of the general moral requirement that a Christian
refrain from lying and giving false testimony.
Id. Undoubtedly Dean Milhizer is correct as a general proposition, although iconic Texas
journalist Molly Ivins supplied a counter example in a somewhat different context: "Governor
Bill Clements, when asked why he had repeatedly lied about the Southern Methodist University
football scandal, replied reasonably enough, "Well, there was never a Bible in the room." MOLLY
IVINS, MOLLY IVINS CAN'T SAY THAT, CAN SHE? 59 (1991).

103. Milhizer, supra note 8, at 63 ("Muslims do not consider swearing on a religious artifact,
including the Quran, to be essential for a valid oath. Muslims have a pre-existing obligation from
shariahto speak the truth, making it unnecessary for Muslim witnesses to use the Quran in oath
ceremonies").
104. Id.
at 70.
105. Id.
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He concludes, "If the witness cannot swear to God in this manner, or
swear at10all,
or does not believe in any form of divinity, he can instead
' 6
affirm."
The proposal is clever but ultimately unavailing. Although it would
allow many witnesses to swear a generic oath, it would also discriminate
against witnesses who wish to swear an oath but whose religious beliefs
conflict with his "non-specific invocation of God" made without any
religious artifacts. 10 7 The proposal would exclude all believers in
polytheistic religions. Depending on the context and the beliefs of the
individual, the proposal might exclude Buddhists, Shintos, Hindus,
Wiccans, pagans, and followers of a wide range of indigenous religions
in Africa and China. It would exclude Christians and Muslims whose
idiosyncratic beliefs require the use of the Bible or Quran in the oath
ceremony or nomenclature other than "God."1 0 8 It would exclude
witnesses who want to swear an oath using other religious artifacts:
Any consideration of the [option to accede to an oath taker's
request to use any artifact which he considers symbolic of his
religious beliefs] must appreciate the enormous breadth of its
logical extension. If no distinctions are to be drawn on substantive
religious bases, then the range of permitted "religious" artifacts
would be virtually unlimited. The only valid criterion for
excluding an artifact would be on the basis that the reasons offered
by an oath taker in support if its use did not conform to the oath's
underlying purposes. Exclusion would thus turn solely upon the
subjective and professed rationale for the object's use, and not
upon the objective nature or legitimacy of the object itself.' 9

106. Id.
107. Id.at 60.
108. See, e.g., one Arizona pastor reported the plan of a North Carolina judge "to remove
all references to God from his courtrooms... by having witnesses no longer to swear on the Bible
and the witness oaths would no longer mention God." The pastor's reaction was negative:
Nothing could be more important for a Christian and especially for a preacher
than to bear witness unto the truth. 0 that every preacher of God would place his
hand on the King James Bible, which is the scripture of truth and bear witness

unto the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
Mike Storti, Bearing Witness unto the Truth, BIBLE WATCHMAN, http://biblewatchman.com/
witness.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2016).

109. Milhizer, supra note 8, at 65-66. Of course, when dealing with religious belief it may
be difficult to ascertain "the objective nature or legitimacy of the object itself." See Alison Lesley,
Jesus Appeared in Mexican Woman's Tortilla, WORLD RELIGION NEWS (Aug. 3, 2015),

http://www.worldreligionnews.com/religion-news/christianity/mexican-woman-sees-jesus-in-he
r-tortilla (reporting claim "that Jesus' face has miraculously appeared in one of the tiayadas
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He also identifies the possibility of witnesses wanting to do
affirmations using non-religious artifacts:
Moreover, as affirmation is recognized as an alternative to oaths,
presumably "non-religious" objects should likewise be allowed if
an affirmer contends that they would enhance the efficacy of his
affirmation. In other words, any distinction between religious
artifacts and secular objects would evaporate; courts would be
obligated to permit, for example, a philosophical text or a picture
way they would allow the Bible
of Elvis for affirmers in the 1same
10
takers.
oath
for
or the Quran
Dean Milhizer also raises the horror of followers of non-traditional
religions asserting their rights. Courts might be called upon "to determine
whether Scientology qualifies as a religion," and if it does, to allow "its
artifacts" to "be used during oath ceremonies."' " He continues:
What about New Age spirituality and secular humanism, or for that
matter Satanism and witchcraft? The list seems inexhaustible.
Indeed, if the definition of a "religion" does not include a
requirement for a community of believers or a demonstrable
historical basis, then any witness would be free to mint his own
personal religion before testifying and2 insist upon using its unique
and individually specified artifacts."1
Why is it inappropriate to have oaths and oath rituals tailored to the
individual beliefs of witnesses? After all, the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 113 and the constitutional" 14 and statutory" 5 provisions of fortyfive states contemplate an individualized oath, one designed to impress
the duty to testify truthfully on the witness' conscience. These provisions
do precisely what Dean Milhizer seeks to avoid-they look to the
subjective and professed beliefs of the witness.1 1 6 It turns out, his
objection to individualized oaths and oath rituals is essentially stylistic:

(tortilla)" being prepared.).
110. Milhizer, supra note 8, at 66.
111. Id. at 67.
112. Id.
1 3. FED. R. EVID. 603. ("Before testifying, a witness must give an oath or affirmation to
testify truthfully. It must be in a form designed to impress that duty on the witness' conscience").
114. See infraapp.A, items], 2,3,4,5, 6& 7.
115. See infra app. B, items 2b, 3b, 4a, 4b, 5a, 5c, 6a, 7b, 8b, 9a, 9c, I Ia, 12b, 13b, 14b,
15a, l5b, 16a, 18b, 19a, 19c, 20a, 20c, 21b, 22a, 22c, 23b, 24c, 25b, 27c, 28b, 29a, 29c, 30b, 32c,
33a, 34b, 35b, 36a, 37c, 38a, 39c, 41b, 42b, 43a, 44a, 45b, 46b, 47b, 48b, 49b, 50a & 5ib.
116. FED. R. EVID. 603.
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Such a prospect is intolerable. Unusual or elaborate forms of oaths,
and controversial and offensive artifacts, would be distracting or
worse. They could undermine the solemnity and decorum that is
necessary and expected in courts of law. They could unduly detract
from the credibility of a witness based on an expression of his
religious beliefs when taking his oath. And, they could offend
many more people, including the parties at trial and the public
generally, than would be offended if all artifacts were categorically
prohibited. Depending on the artifact used, the integrity and
effectiveness of the justice system could be seriously
compromised, thereby defeating the very purpose that oaths and
117
affirmations were intended to serve.
Of course, the horrors from having a witness swear an oath using the
Scientology cross or the Sigil of Baphomet-much less having a devotee
of early rock and roll affirm using a velvet portrait of Elvis-would be
avoided in the main by adopting the reform suggested to avoid the
credibility problem: have witnesses swear or affirm out of the presence
of the judge and jury.1 18 The oaths and affirmations of witnesses could be
taken out of the public view, as well, to avoid the public offense that
might come from having a witness take an oath on a sacred rock, a portrait
of Elvis, or a tortilla with an image of Jesus.119
The most substantial barrier to the proposal to have an oath to an
undifferentiated God sans religious artifacts is that it would violate the
20
state constitutional anti-preference provisions of thirty-one states.1
These provisions essentially prohibit preferences given by law to any
religious denomination, creed, or mode of worship. It is hard to imagine
an action of the state that would more clearly violate such a constitutional
guarantee than a statute allowing witnesses from one faith tradition to
swear a religious oath while denying the same right to other witnesses
simply because they believe in another faith tradition.
Having oaths tailored to each witness' religious opinions and
beliefs-and affirmations for any who wished--could be implemented in
conjunction with having oaths and affirmations administered out of the
hearing of the finder of fact. Such an arrangement would address both the
credibility problem and the preference and free exercise problem. But
such a system would fail to address the third problem-privacy-to
which we now turn.

117.
118.
119.
appeared
120.

Milhizer, supra note 8, at 67-68.
Id. at66-67.
Id. See Lesley, supra note 109 (reporting claim "that Jesus' face has miraculously
in one of the tiayadas (tortilla)" being prepared.).
See infra app. C, items 1-31.
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IV. WITNESS OATHS AND PRIVACY
In 2007, Catherine Nicole Donkers' legal malpractice case took an
adverse turn when it came time for her to testify at a deposition. 121 She
"refused to raise her right hand and to be sworn under oath [and] claimed
that raising her right hand would violate her religious beliefs."' 122 At a
subsequent motion hearing, "Donkers again refused to raise her right
hand and to be sworn under oath. She indicated that she would affirm to
tell the truth, but stated that she was still unwilling to raise her right hand
for religious reasons."' 123 There followed an exchange between Catherine
Donkers and Judge Melinda Morris of the Washtenaw County Circuit
Court:
Court: Are you going to raise your right [hand] or not?
PlaintiffDonkers:No ma'am. It's writCourt: Okay if not then I dismiss your case and you may take it up
on appeal.
PlaintiffDonkers:Ma'amCourt: Your case is dismissed.
Defendant: Thank you, Your Honor.
PlaintiffDonkers:Ma'am I haven't [been] given an opportunity.
The same thing... happened at the deposition.
Court: That's right, your case is dismissed.
PlaintiffDonkers: I didn't have an opportunity to state what my
substitute oath would be....
Plaintiff Donkers: Ma'am, I'm going to object. I haven't been
given an opportunity to say what my subCourt: You know what you do when you object, you appeal. You
appeal to the Court of Appeals and explain to them why it is you
will not affirm that you will tell the truth on a deposition. There is
121. See Ed Wesoloski, I's the Truth, I Swear (Or Affirm), MICHIGAN LAW. (June 20, 2008),
https://michiganlawyerblog.wordpress.com/category/oaths/.
122. Donkers v. Kovach, 745 N.W.2d 154, 155 (Mich. App. 2007).
123. Id.
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nothing religious about that. There is no basis for any religious
objection. The case is dismissed.
PlaintiffDonkers:I had offered to tell the truth... this [is] exactly
what I offered to say at the deposition as a substitute for an oath.
I've had no problem in any other court in Michigan. I've had no
problem in Nevada.
Court: The record is turned off, so you're talking to the wind

here. 124
Judge Morris dismissed Donkers' claims with prejudice.
Donkers appealed the dismissal of her case to the Michigan Court of
Appeals, 12 5 which reviewed the applicable statutes and concluded "that
the act of raising one's right hand is not required to effectuate a valid
affirmation .... 126 The court also used the Michigan enactment of FRE
603 to conclude that, notwithstanding the statutory language providing
for a raised right hand, "that it is not necessary for a witness to raise his
or her right hand or to engage in any special formalities when swearing
or affirming to testify truthfully ... "127 The majority remanded for
reinstatement of Donkers' claims. Over the vigorous dissent of three
justices, the Michigan Supreme Court8 declined to review the Court of
12
Appeals decision in Donkers' favor.
The case of Catherine Nicole Donkers illustrates the privacy problem
caused by some contemporary oath and affirmation procedures. The
general problem is that our oath and affirmation procedures require
witnesses to divulge information about their religious beliefs that they
might quite understandably wish to keep private. The oath and
affirmation procedures do this in three ways.
First, thirty-one states make the religious oath their default, thus
requiring witnesses to opt out of the religious option,129 and even in the
124.
125.

Id. at 156; Wesoloski, supra note 121.
See Donkers v. Kovach, 745 N.W.2d 154 (Mich. App. 2007). The Court of Appeals is

imprecise about the exact claim being made. The court's recitation of the facts makes it appear
that she refused to raise her right hand and be sworn. See id. at 155 ("At the time of the deposition,
Donkers refused to raise her right hand and to be sworn under oath." "At a subsequent motion
hearing before the trial court, Donkers again refused to raise her right hand and to be sworn under

oath.") (emphasis added). But the court cast the question as whether Catherine could be required
to raise her right hand to recite an affirmation. See id. at 156 ("We ... conclude that the act of
raising one's right hand is not required when affirming to testify truthfully.") (emphasis added).
126. Id. at 158.
127. Id.
128. Donkers v. Kovach, 749 N.W.2d 744 (Mich., 2008).
129. Infra app. B, items 5a, 7a, 8a, 9a, 12a, 13a, 14a, 15a, 17a, 18a, 19b, 20a, 22a, 23a, 24a,

27a, 28a, 30a, 32a, 34a, 37a, 39a, 40b, 41a, 42a, 46a, 47a, 48a, 49a, 50a & 51a.
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nineteen states that have facial parity between oaths and affirmations, it
is reasonable to assume that the traditional oath form is the default.' 3 0 The
opt-out requirement in effect requires witnesses with objections to the
religious oath to make some level of disclosure about their religious

beliefs.
Second, eighteen states have a substantive predicate relating to the
witness' religious beliefs before the witness can affirm.' 3 ' Satisfying
these requires some level of disclosure of the witness' religious beliefs.
Third, where a witness has religious objections to both the oath and

the affirmation options, and wants to craft an alternative means of
qualifying, the witness is required to disclose more details about his or
her religious beliefs. There are a number of cases where witnesses have
objected to both the oath and the affirmation option 132 or to the
ceremonial aspects of the oath or affirmation alternatives on religious
grounds. 133 Understandably, the witnesses who object to the standard
130. lnfraapp. B, items 2a, 3a, 4a, 6a, iOa, Ila, 16a, 21a, 25a, 26a, 29a, 31a, 33a, 35a, 36a,
38a, 43a, 44a & 45a. I am aware of judges in jurisdictions that do not have a statutory oath form
who have recast the traditional oath along the lines of "Do you swear that the testimony you are
about to give shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?" Although such a form
retains a religious cast, through the use of the "swear" terminology, by omitting the traditional
ending "so help you God" it is clearly less religious, and presumably more broadly acceptable,
than the traditional form.
131. Infra app. B, items 5a, 8a, 9a, 14a, 17a, 18a, 22a, 23a, 24a, 30a, 34a, 37a, 42a, 46a,
47a, 48a, 50a & 51a.
132. Bisby v. State, 907 S.W.2d 949, 953 (Tex. App. 1995); Gordon v. Idaho, 778 F.2d
1397, 1399-1400 (9th Cir. 1985); Oliver v. State Tax Comm'n, 37 S.W.3d 243, 245 (Mo. 2001);
Scott v. State, 80 S.W.3d 184, 189 (Tex. App. 2002); Soc'y of Separationists, Inc. v. Herman, 939
F.2d 1207, 1209 (5th Cir. 1991); State v. Allen, 2009 MT 90NLEXIS 101, P89 (Mont. 2009);
State v. Bowlin, 850 S.W.2d 116, 117 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); State v. Corrigan, 2012 WL 612313,
at 3 (Minn. App. 2012) (refusal to allow defendant to affirm "I solemnly undertake to tell the
truth"); State v. Spulak, 720 S.W.2d 396, 397 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (defendant could not swear
because of his sincerely held religious beliefs, "he explained that affirmed is a euphemism for
swear"); United States v. Looper, 419 F.2d 1405, 1406 (4th Cir. 1969); United States v. Moore,
217 F.2d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 1954), rev'd,348 U.S. 966 (1955); United States v. Ward, 989 F.2d
1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1992) (requesting alternative oath substituting "fully integrated Honesty" for
"truth"); Ferguson v. Commissioner, 921 F.2d 588, 588 (5th Cir. 1991):
Appellant is forbidden to swear as evidence by the Bible directive from her God,
and since the word "oath" has become synonymous and interchangeable with the
word "affirmation," and the word "swear" [has] become synonymous and
interchangeable with the word "affirm," as is evidenced in I U.S.C. 1 and many
other authorities, it is appellant's sincere belief that "affirmation" is just an "other
oath" and "affirm" falls with "swear not at all." Also, "affirmation" is the chosen
form of those who denounce the very existence of God. Because of these things,
"swear" and "affirm" are very repugnant to appellant.
133. ACLU of N.C., Inc. v. State, 639 S.E.2d 136, 137 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007) (request to
swear on Quran rather than Bible); Donkers v. Kovach, 745 N.W.2d 154, 155 (Mich. Ct. App.
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oath and affirmation options frequently represent religious traditions
134
other than the Christian faith
and non-mainstream religious traditions
35
faith.
Christian
the
within

Donkers faced all three of these requirements to divulge information
about her religious beliefs. The Michigan statute starts by assuming that
the default position should be to require a religious oath.136 It then adds a
substantive test to use an affirmation instead of the default religious
oath. 137 It includes a ceremonial component that she raise her right hand
38
which conflicted with Donkers' faith.1
It is especially problematic that our oath and affirmation procedures
require witnesses to divulge information about their religious beliefs
because of the role religious belief has assumed in society. One of the
most corrosive features of our contemporary national life is the open
hostility with which some Americans confront those whose religious
beliefs differ from theirs. 139 In such an environment, it is neither
unexpected nor unreasonable to want to keep our religious beliefs private.
In the main, the government respects this desire for privacy on
religious matters. Benjamin Franklin famously observed that "nothing
can be said to be certain, except death and taxes,"' 140 and in those areas,

2007) (raise right hand); United States v. Looper, 419 F.2d 1405, 1406 (4th Cir. 1969) (raise right
hand). Cushing, supranote 53 (Musaitefv. Musaitef, request to swear on Quran rather than Bible).
134. ACLUofN.C., 639 S.E.2d at 137 (Muslim); Soc'y of Separationists,939 F.2d at 1209
(atheist); Bowlin, 850 S.W.2d atl 17 (Hebrew).
135. Looper, 419 F.2d at 1405 (Radio Church of God); Moore, 217 F.2d at 430 (Church of
Jesus Christ of Sullivan (Harshmanites)).
136. See infra app. B, item 23a.
137. See id. ("Every person conscientiously opposed to taking an oath may, instead of
swearing, solemnly and sincerely affirm, under the pains and penalties of perjury.")
138. See id.
139. A 2014 study by the Pew Research Center on Religion & Public Life suggests the
contours of the situation. On a scale of zero to 100, with zero being the most negative and 100 the
most positive, no religious group received an overall rating in the "most positive" category (67 to
100). Overall ratings ranged from Jews (63) to Muslims (40), with Hindus (50) Mormons (48),
atheists (41) and Muslims (40) scoring at the midpoint of 50 or lower. The values assigned by
some groups to others are revealing. Protestants gave atheists a 32; white evangelical Christians
gave atheists a 25; atheists gave white evangelical Christians a 28; black protestants gave
Buddhists a 41, Hindus a 42, Mormons a 42, atheists a 30, and Muslims a 44; white evangelical
Christians gave Buddhists a 39, Hindus a 38, Mormons a 47, and Muslims a 30. How Americans
Feel About Religious Groups: Jews, Catholics & Evangelicals Rated Warmly, Atheists and
Muslims More Coldly, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (July 16, 2014), http://www.pewforum.org/2014/
07/16/how-americans-feel-about-religious-groups/.
140. In a letter to Jean-Baptiste Leroy dated November 13, 1789, Benjamin Franklin
observed that "in this world nothing can be said to be certain, except death and taxes." Letter from
Benjamin Franklin to Jean-Baptiste Leroy (Nov. 13, 1789), reprinted in I THE PRIVATE
CORRESPONDENCE OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 258 (1818).
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religious privacy is provided: One can die 14 1 and pay taxes' 42 without
143
having to disclose one's religious beliefs... One can also be born,
obtain a social security card, 144 attend public school, 145 secure a driver's
148
147
license, 146 sign up for the selective service, participate in the census,

and register to vote, 149 all without disclosing one's religious beliefs.
There is only one situation where the government routinely compels
individuals to either disclose their religious beliefs or violate them: when
a witness is subpoenaed to testify in court and is required to either take a
default religious oath or request an affirmation.
Reforming our oath and affirmation practices to eliminate the first two
of the ways in which witnesses are forced to divulge their religious
beliefs-the default to oaths and the substantive predicates to opt out of
the religious oath-would be straightforward: simply make the non150
religious affirmation the default method of qualifying witnesses.
141. See, e.g., Electronic Death Registration System, ALA. DEP'T PUBLIC HEALTH
(Aug. 2014), http://www.adph.org/edrs/assets/EDRSTrainingMedicalFacilitiesAugust20l4.pdf
(electronic death registration system provides for the input of no information on religion).
142. Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (2015),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/fl 040.pdf (no information on religion).
143. See, e.g., Idaho Certificate of Live Birth, IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
WELFARE, http://www.healthandwelfare.idaho.gov/Portals/O/Health/Vital%20Records/Complet
eBirths.pdf (last updated Jan. 1, 2012) (birth registration system provides for the input of
information on race, ethnicity and education of parents, but no information on religion).
144. Application for a Social Security Card, Form SS-5, SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION, https://www.ssa.gov/forms/ss-5.pdf (last modified Aug. 2011) (providing for
information on race and ethnicity but not information on religion).
145. See, e.g., Student Registration Form, PORTLAND PUBLIC SCHOOLS, http://www.pps.kl 2.
(last revised Aug. 8, 2014)
or.us/files/enrollment-transfer/Registration-Form-2014-15.pdf
(requiring information on race and ethnicity but not information on religion for registration of
student to attend Portland, Oregon public schools).
146. See, e.g., Michigan Secretary of State, Applying for a License or ID? U.S. Citizens,
Permanent Residents, & Refugees Need the Following Documents, MICHIGAN SECRETARY OF
STATE, http://www.michigan.gov/documents/DE40 032001_20459 7.pdf (last updated Feb.
2016), http://www.michigan.gov/documents/DE40_ 032001_20459_7.pdf (application for motor
vehicle operator license or identification card requires no information on religion).
147. Selective Service System RegistrationForm, SSS Form 1, SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM,
https://www.sss.gov/Portals/0/PDFs/regform copylNT.pdf (no information on religion).
148. Act of Oct. 17, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-521, 90 Stat. 2459 (1976); 13 U.S.C. 221(c) (1976)
("no person shall be compelled to disclose information relative to his religious beliefs or to
membership in a religious body.").
149. See, e.g., New York State Voter Registration Form, NY STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS,
http://www.elections.ny.gov/NYSBOE/download/voting/voteform.pdf (last revised Sept. 2015)
(no information on religion).
150. Making the non-religious affirmation the default does not address the third way in
which witnesses are forced to divulge their religious beliefs-when the witness has religious
objections to both the oath and the affirmation options, and is required to disclose more details
about his or her religious beliefs so that the court might craft a method of qualifying the witness
compatible with the witness' religious beliefs. Presumably one could eliminate all such objections
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Witnesses would be able to qualify without divulging any information
concerning their religious beliefs. A witness desirous of using a religious
oath would be able to make an election among a set of standard
alternatives or, if none of the standard alternatives conformed to the
witness' beliefs, the witness could arrange a custom oath with the court
official charged with overseeing witness qualifications. The object of the
affirmation and oath procedures would be to secure from each witness
what is required by FRE 603: an undertaking to testify truthfully "in a
15 1
form designed to impress that duty on the witness' conscience."

V. WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE?

Witness oaths and affirmations are in need of a final evolution. At
present, some witnesses are subjected to credibility assessments
improperly influenced by their religious beliefs. Some are discriminated
against in how they qualify to testify, based solely on their religious
beliefs. Some are compelled to disclose information on their religious
beliefs that they would like to keep private in order to avoid violating
those beliefs. There are essentially two options for evolutionary change,
between which we can choose:
1. The reform option retains oaths and affirmations but reforms
them to eliminate improper credibility determinations based on
religion, eliminate preferences for some religions, and minimize
the required disclosure of witness religious information.
2. The representationoption eliminates oaths and affirmations and
substitutes a uniform, non-religious representation.
A. The Reform Option
The reform option retains oaths and affirmations but reforms them. It
provides a non-religious affirmation as a means of witness qualification.
To minimize situations in which witnesses have to disclose religious
information they would prefer to keep private-the problem illustrated
by the case of Catherine Nicole Donkers-affirmation is the default, with
witnesses able to opt out of affirmation and into a religious oath at will,
with no predicate showing.
The reform option provides a range of standard oath options for
established faith groups. To preclude preferences among religious
groups-the problem illustrated by the case of Rawda Musaitefonly by eliminating oaths and affirmations for qualifying witnesses, and rewriting our perjury
statutes to define the crime simply as testifying falsely.
15 1. FED. R. EVLD. 603.
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witnesses with religious beliefs not represented in the range of standard
oath options can arrange with the court for a custom oath consistent with
their beliefs.
Finally, to preclude credibility assessments improperly influenced by
the religious beliefs of the witness-the problem illustrated by the case
of Dr. Abbas Husain-under the reform option, all witnesses are qualified
out of the presence of the judge and jury.
While the reform option addresses the credibility problem, the
preference and free exercise problem, and the privacy problem, it is not
without disadvantages. It requires a complicated and inefficient system
of oaths and affirmations with a wide range of oath and affirmation forms
based on the religious beliefs of individual witnesses. It removes witness
qualifications from the presence of the judge and jury.
B. The Representation Option
The representation option eliminates oaths and affirmations and
substitutes a uniform, non-religious representation. 152 The representation
is structured as a question from the court along the following lines: "Do
you representthat the testimony you are about to give shall be the truth,
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, and do you understand that
your testimony will be subject to the pains andpenalties ofperjury?" To
which the witness would respond either "I do" or "yes." Such a
representation would constitute an undertaking to testify truthfully "in a
form designed to impress that duty on 1the
witness' conscience" as
53
required by the Federal Rules of Evidence.

152. Whether it would be possible to construct an oath or affirmation devoid of specific
religious content, such that it could be administered to all witnesses is not a new question, it was
the subject of debate in the mid-eighteenth century. Helen Silving, The Oath: 1, 68 YALE L.J.
1329, 1333 (1959). One view held that the oath, even with religious references, did not imply a
theistic position such as to render it inappropriate with any witness. Id. at 1353 ("religious
references in the oath were inconsequential additions that did not affect its essence; the religious
oath formula did not even imply a theistic attitude."). A moderate view thought it possible to
secularize the oath. Id. at 1353 ("Moderates maintained that it was at least possible to secularize
the oath by omitting religious references."). The extreme view was that even an oath with
secularized language could not render it without religious import. Id. at 1353 ("In the extreme
opposing view, even omission of all express religious content could not deprive the oath of its
essentially religious connotation."). In her study Professor Helen Silving identified the problem:
"Assuming that the terms 'I swear' may be assigned any chosen meaning, some commentators
have raised the question of what that meaning is if it is not religious: 'the so-called 'secular oath
formula' had either a religious meaning . . . or no meaning at all."' Id. at 1353. The same three
positions might be asserted today.
153. FED. R. EvID. 603. The representation option requires a simple reworking of the
language of two sections of the Federal rules and the state adoptions of those rules. FRE 603 could
be rewritten as follows:
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This is, in effect, phasing out religious oaths and moving uniformly to
a non-religious affmnation. The only reason the "affirmation"
nomenclature is not used in this option is the existence of cases in which
witnesses have successfully interposed religious objections to
affirmations. 154 Hence the designation of this option as a
"representation."
Under the representation option, all witnesses are qualified in a way
that does not reflect their religious beliefs. This precludes credibility
assessments improperly influenced by the religious beliefs of the witness
disclosed through qualification-the problem illustrated by the case of
Dr. Abbas Husain-so that witnesses do not need to be qualified out of
the presence of the judge and jury. Under the representation option,
preferences among religious groups-the problem illustrated by the case
of Rawda Musaitef-are precluded. Finally, under the representation
option, the disclosure of religious information that witnesses preferred to
keep private-the problem illustrated by the case of Catherine Nicole

Before testifying, a witness must give a representation,oath or affirmation to
testify truthfully. It must be in a form designed to impress that duty on the
witness' conscience.
The "oath or affirmation" nomenclature would be retained to provide for the situation in which a
witness makes a religious objection to the representation. The Federal Rules of Evidence and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would also have to be rewritten to add representations to the
current language.
154. Bisby v. State, 907 S.W.2d 949, 953 (Tex. App. 1995); Gordon v. Idaho, 778 F.2d
1397, 1399-1400 (9th Cir. 1985); Oliver v. State Tax Comm'n, 37 S.W.3d 243, 245 (Mo. 2001);
Scott v. State, 80 S.W.3d 184, 189 (Tex. App. 2002); Soc'y of Separationists, Inc. v. Herman, 939
F.2d 1207, 1209 (5th Cir. 1991); State v. Allen, 2009 MT 90N 101, P8 (Mont. 2009); State v.
Bowlin, 850 S.W.2d 116, 117 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); State v. Corrigan, 2012 WL 612313, at 3
(Minn. App. 2012) (refusal to allow defendant to affirm "I solemnly undertake to tell the truth");
State v. Spulak, 720 S.W.2d 396, 397 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (defendant could not swear because
of his sincerely held religious beliefs, "he explained that affirmed is a euphemism for swear");
United States v. Looper, 419 F.2d 1405, 1406 (4th Cir. 1969); United States v. Moore, 217 F.2d
428, 430 (7th Cir. 1954), rev'd,348 U.S. 966 (1955); United States v. Ward, 989 F.2d 1015, 1017
(9th Cir. 1992) (requesting alternative oath substituting "fully integrated Honesty" for "truth");
Ferguson v. Commissioner, 921 F.2d 588, 588 (5th Cir. 1991):
Appellant is forbidden to swear as evidence by the Bible directive from her God,
and since the word "oath" has become synonymous and interchangeable with the
word "affirmation," and the word "swear" [has] become synonymous and
interchangeable with the word "affirm," as is evidenced in I U.S.C. I and many
other authorities, it is appellant's sincere belief that "affirmation" is just an "other
oath" and "affirm" falls with "swear not at all." Also, "affirmation" is the chosen
form of those who denounce the very existence of God. Because of these things,
"swear" and "affirm" are very repugnant to appellant.

See id.
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Donkers-is almost completely eliminated.
While the representation option addresses the credibility problem, the
preference and free exercise problem, and the privacy problem, it has
some potential disadvantages. For example, it might be that there are
witnesses for whom a particular form of religious oath would more
strongly bind the witness' conscience to tell the truth. But as Dean
Milhizer observes in the context of the use of religious artifacts in the
oath process, it is not necessary that the oath and affirmation used be the
strongest form as to the individual witness; it is enough if the form "raises
sufficient awareness in the mind of the oath taker of his truth-telling
obligations."'1 55 The representation proposed meets Dean Milhizer's
standard.
Another potential disadvantage is that some witnesses would
undoubtedly raise objections to the representation based on their religious
beliefs. As with objections to the current affirmation option, if the witness
made a threshold showing of sincerity, courts would be reluctant to reject
such an objection. Such witnesses should be allowed to work with the
court to fashion a means of qualification which constitutes an undertaking
to testify truthfully in a form designed to impress that duty on the witness'
conscience as required by the Federal Rules of Evidence, and is
nevertheless consistent with the witness' religious beliefs.' 56 It is
assumed that such witnesses would be so rare as to not require that
qualifications be done out of the presence of the judge and jury.
There is, of course, an additional theoretical option. We could
eliminate oaths and affirmations, not put anything in their place, and rely
solely on the civil and criminal perjury statutes to motivate witnesses to
be truthful.' 5 7
155.

Milhizer, supra note 8, at 62:
It is sufficient that the oath binds the conscience of the oath taker to tell the truth;
it is not, however, necessary that the oath and its accompanying ceremony bind
an oath taker's conscience in the strongest conceivable manner. Thus, the
imperative of the court system to discover and preserve truth and administer
justice is met if the form and manner of the oath or affirmation raises sufficient
awareness in the mind of the oath taker of his truth-telling obligations.

156.

FED. R. EvID. 603.

157. One could include a judicial declaration of the expectations for witnesses and the
existence of the perjury penalty. For example: "You are hereby put on notice that in the testimony
you are about to give you are requiredby law to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
the truth, and that your testimony will be subject to the pains andpenalties ofperjury." Lacking
a witness response, such a representation would not constitute an undertaking to testify truthfully,
"in a form designed to impress that duty on the witness' conscience" as required by FRE 603 and
would require a revision of the rule and its progeny. FED. R. EvIo. 603. The Federal Rules of
Evidence and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and their state counterparts would also have
to be rewritten to substitute a judicial declaration for the oaths and affirmations in the current
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Doing away with oaths and affirmations entirely is not a new proposal.
British utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham called for the elimination
of testimonial oaths in the mid-nineteenth century.' 5 8 At the turn of the
last century, American journalist and social commentator Ambrose
Bierce correctly described the connection between oaths and perjury
when he defined the testimonial oath as: "[i]n law, a solemn appeal to the
Deity, made binding upon the conscience by a penalty for perjury."'] 59 In
her remarkable 1959 work on oaths, Yale Professor Helen Silving
concluded that "[iun order to uphold both its own dignity and the dignity
160
of its citizens, the state should not participate in oath-taking at all.'
Eliminating oaths and affirmations would solve the credibility
problem, the preference and free exercise problem, and the privacy
problem. Witnesses would not be subjected to credibility assessments
improperly influenced by the religious beliefs of the witness disclosed
through qualification. Preferences among religious groups would be
abolished. Witnesses would not be forced to disclose information as to
their religious beliefs. Why, then, not consider this option? Because the
representation option brings essentially identical benefits while
maintaining a ritual in which the witness is called upon to make a
commitment to testify truthfully. It is impossible to prove that such a
ritual has a positive influence on witnesses, but after numerous
discussions with lawyers and judges whose judgment I respect, I know
that they are convinced of the value of having some affirmative
commitment on the part of witnesses. If they are convinced, so am I.
In which direction should the final evolution of oaths and affirmations
take us? The answer, I believe, comes from who we have become as a
nation, and who we should aspire to be.
Witness oaths and affirmations had their origin in a much simpler
time. Before the middle of the eighteenth century, witness oaths were
uncomplicated, as only Christians could be witnesses. In 1745,
Omychund v. Barker opened the door to non-Christian witnesses,
although atheists remained incompetent by virtue of their religious
beliefs. 16 1 After Omychund, there developed-in theory, at least-a
remarkable number of different ways in which to accommodate different
religious beliefs. 162 But even with the theoretical possibility of having
language.
158. 5 JEREMY BENTHAM, "Swear Not At All:" Containingan Exposure of the Needlessness
and Mischievousness, as Well as Anti-Christianityof the Ceremony ofan Oath, in THE WORKS OF
JEREMY BENTHAM, 187 (1843).
159. AMBROSE BIERCE, THE DEVIL'S DICTIONARY (1911).

160. Helen Silving, The Oath: 11, 68 YALE L.J. 1527, 1576 (1959).
161. Omychund v. Barker, (1744) 26 Eng. Rep. 15 (K.B.).
162. Vestal, supra note 1, at 73. These included Jews ("on the Pentateuch with covered
heads"), "Mahometans" (upon the Koran), "Gentoos" ("touching the foot of a Brahmin (or
priest"), Chinese ("by the ceremony of killing a cock, or breaking a saucer, the witness declaring
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non-Christian witnesses in American courtrooms, drafting statutory
provisions on oaths and affirmations must have seemed relatively simple
two centuries ago. There were, after all, in mid-nineteenth century
America, a vanishingly small number of people who publicly
acknowledged non-Abrahamic religious beliefs.
No longer; religious diversity has long ceased to be merely a
theoretical possibility in this nation. We have become a strikingly diverse
society on matters of religious belief. Today, only a minority of adult
Americans identify as Protestant Christians. 16 3 Some 56.1 million of us
are "unaffiliated:" atheists, agnostics, and those who identify as "nothing
in particular."1 " The unaffiliated outnumber both Catholics and mainline
Protestants.1 65 Some 14.5 million adult Americans identify with nonChristian faiths: 2.2 million Muslims, 4.7 million Jews, 1.7 million
Hindus, and 1.7 million Buddhists.1 6 6 The research suggests that our
religious diversity is going to increase. Between 2007 and 2014,
Protestant Christians went from majority to minority status.1 67 During the
same period, the percentages for Christians,-Protestants, Catholics,
Evangelicals, mainline Protestants, historically black Christian groups,
Orthodox Christians, and Mormons-all declined; and the percentages
for Jews, Muslims, Hindus, atheists, agnostics, and those responding

that, if he speaks falsely, his soul will be similarly dealt with"), "a Scotch covenanter and a
member of the Scottish Kirk" ("by holding up the hand, without kissing the book"), and a
"Hindoo" ("by the uplifting of the hand"). JAMES M. HENDERSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW
OF EVIDENCE (San Francisco, 1926), at 3914-15, 3914 n. 19 (as to "Hindoo"). "Quakers and others,
who profess to entertain conscientious scruples against taking an oath in the usual form, are
allowed an affirmation, i.e., a solemn religious asservation that their testimony shall be true." Id.
at 3915.
163. America's Changing Religious Landscape: Christians Decline Sharply as Share of
Population; Unaffiliated and Other Faiths Continue to Grow, PEW RESEARCH CENTER
(May 12, 2015), http://www.pewforum.org/2015/05/12/americas-changing-religious-landscape/
[hereinafter 2015 PEW RESEARCH SURVEY] (reporting 46.5% of adults identifying as Christian
protestants). The study uses nearly 245 million for the number of adult Americans.
164. Id. The study reports 2014 allocations of 3.1% (atheists), 4.0% (agnostics), and 15.8%
(nothing in particular), for an aggregate unaffiliated score of 22.9%. Using the 245 million figure
for American adults, these translate into 7.6 million atheists, 9.8 million agnostics, and 38.7
identified as "nothing in particular."
165. Id. (reporting 20.8% of adults identifying as Catholics; 14.7% as mainline Protestants;
and 3.1% as atheists, 4.0% as agnostics, and 15.8% as "nothing in particular," for an unaffiliated
total of 22.8%).
166. Id. The study uses an overall adult population of nearly 245 million, with 2014
allocations of 0.9% (Muslim), 0.7% (Buddhist), and 0.7% (Hindu). Some 4,655,000 people, 1.9%
of the total, are identified as Jewish.
167. ld. (demonstrating Protestant Christians went from 51.3% in 2007 to 46.5% in 2014, a
9.4% decline.
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"nothing in particular" all increased. 168 Looking at age cohorts 169 and
marriage patterns 70 suggests that our diversity on matters of religion will
only increase.
Given our religious diversity, adopting the reform option would create
a complex and unwieldy oath and affirmation system. It would be
challenging to adopt oaths and affirmations to meet the religious
requirements of witnesses who are adherents of the many variations of
Christianity, and the challenge would be compounded by witnesses who
are adherents of non-Christian faith traditions, including agnosticism,
atheism, Baha'ism, Buddhism, Confucianism, Druidism, Hinduism,
Islam, Jainism, Judaism, Satanism, Scientology, Shinto, Sikhism,
Taoism, Wicca, and Zoroastrianism. Additionally, the system would have
to accommodate witnesses whose individual religious beliefs require
custom oaths and affirmations. We could create and maintain such a
system. The question is, would it be worth the effort?
Beyond the logistical challenges of the reform option lies a question
of mutual respect. Respect for citizens of different religious beliefs is
more than mere toleration. At the close of the eighteenth century, Baptist
minister John Leland captured the idea: "the very idea of toleration is
despicable; it supposes that some have a pre-eminence above the rest, to
grant indulgence; whereas all should be equally free, Jews, Turks, Pagans
and Christians."'' Nineteenth century lawyer Andrew Dunlap, who
defended Abner Kneeland-the last man imprisoned in the United States
for blasphemy-appropriately identified the tension between toleration
168. Id.(demonstrating that within the Christian grouping, only the Jehovah's Witness and
"other Christian" categories increased in percentage terms; from 0.7% to 0.8%, and 0.3% to 0.4%,
respectively. Within the non-Christian grouping Jewish respondents increased from 1.7% to 1.9%
(which the study notes is not statistically significant), Muslims from 0.4% to 0.9%, and Hindus
from 0.4% to 0.7%. Atheists increased from 1.6% to 3.1%, agnostics from 2.4% to 4%, and
nothing in particular from 12.1% to 15.8%).
169. Id.
One of the most important factors in the declining share of Christians and the
growth of the 'nones' is generational replacement. As the Millennial generation
enters adulthood, its members display much lower levels of religious affiliation,
including less connection with Christian churches, than older generations. Fully
36% of young Millennials (those between the ages of 18 and 24) are religiously
unaffiliated, as are 34% of older Millennials (ages 25-33). And fewer than sixin-ten Millennials identify with any branch of Christianity, compared with sevenin-ten or more among older generations...
Id.
170. Id.(reporting that 39% of those married since 2010 are in religiously mixed marriages,
compared to only 19% in 1960, and that nearly 20% of marriages since 2010 include one
religiously unaffiliated partners, compared to only 5% in 1960).
171. DICKSON D. BRUCE, JR., EARNESTLY CONTENDING:
PLURALISM [N ANTEBELLUM AMERICA 124 (2013).

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND
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and rights: "This is the boasted land of toleration.... No, gentlemen, that
is not the proper word, for who shall presume to tolerate another, when
the latter has an undeniable right to enjoy and maintain his own
172
opinion?5
Respect for citizens of different religious beliefs, upon which the
reform option depends, requires a commitment to equality. We need to
sincerely be willing to accord equal respect to the Muslim witness and
the Presbyterian, the Catholic and the Wiccan, the atheist and the
Episcopalian, the Southern Baptist and the Hindu. As a nation, we fall
short of that standard. At a time when a majority of Americans believe
is a "Christian nation" the reform option should not
that the United States
173
be implemented.
The final challenge to the reform option is the question of what type
of nation we should strive to be. We live in a time of great turmoil based
on religion. Too many Americans are suspicious of and hostile toward
one another based on religion. In such an environment, we are given the
choice between continuing oaths and affirmations that divide us based on
religious belief and having a witness representation, which does not
discriminate among witnesses based on their religious beliefs. There is
something to be said for a choice that unites Americans rather than
divides us based on religion.
There is also something to be said for getting beyond our history in
this matter. Witness oaths and affirmations are the product of our
prejudiced and exclusionary past. Given where we have come in terms of
religious diversity, the number of Americans who represent those
discriminated against by these policies is substantial. In excess of
70,000,000 of us-more than 1 in 4 adult Americans-would have been
172. ld. at 124-25.
173. See Daniel Cox & Robert P. Jones, Most Americans Believe Protests Make the Country
Better; Support Decreases Dramatically Among Whites ifProtesters are Identified As Black,
PUBLIC RELIGION RESEARCH INSTITUTE (June 23, 2015), http://publicreligion.org/research/2015/

06/survey-americans-believe-protests-make-country-better-support-decreases-dramaticaly-prot
esters-identified-black/#.VpVJ9JMrJ27 (demonstrating in a 2015 survey, only 35% of adult
Americans believed "the U.S. was a Christian nation in the past and is still a Christian nation
today," down from 42% only five years previous. Some 45% said "the U.S. was once a Christian
nation but no longer remains so today." Only 14% said "the U.S. has never been a Christian
nation." And among the 45% who thought America had ceased to be a Christian nation, 61% "say

this is a bad thing." There are some indications of generational progress. While 66% of those aged
65 and above "say that being a Christian is an important part of being American," only 35% of

those 18 to 29 agreed. But Americans still see religious faith as central to the American identity.
Overall, 81% of Republicans and 63% of Democrats though that "believing in God is an important
part of being American," although that God being a Christian God was important to only 69% of
Republicans and 46% of Democrats). Kevin M. Kruse, A ChristianNation? Since When?, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 14, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/15/opinion/sunday/a-christian-nation-

since-when.html? r=0 (demonstrating the story of how the identity of America as a Christian
nation came to be is interesting).
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deemed untrustworthy and incompetent to testify under the original rules
on oaths. 174 Over 55,000,000 of us-more than 1 in 5-would have been
75
excluded under the "liberal" rule of Omychund.1
We should complete the evolution of witness oaths and affirmations
by eliminating them in favor of a uniform non-religious witness
representation. Doing so would resolve the credibility problem, the
preference and free exercise problem, and the privacy problem. Because
the method of qualification would not provide any information as to the
witness' religious beliefs, witnesses could be qualified in the presence of
the judge and jury, and they would not be subjected to credibility
assessments improperly influenced by their religious beliefs as disclosed
through qualification. Because no religious references or artifacts would
intrude into the qualification process, preferences among religious groups
would be abolished. Because qualification would be the same regardless
of religious belief, witnesses would not be forced to disclose information
as to their religious beliefs.
Adoption of the representation option would sever the oath and
affirmation link with our prejudiced and exclusionary past. It would be a
final signal that the religious beliefs of a witness are not an indicator of
credibility. And it would signal that equality based on religious belief, not
mere toleration of diverse religious beliefs, is what we seek as a nation.
CONCLUSION

The framers of the Rhode Island constitution eloquently asserted the
connection between religious liberty and a flourishing society when
remembering that:
[A] principal object of our venerable ancestors, in their migration
to this country and their settlement of this state, was, as they
expressed it, to hold forth a lively experiment that a flourishing
civil state may stand and
be best maintained with full liberty in
176
religious concernments.

174. 2015 PEW RESEARCH SURVEY, supra note 163 (using a 2014 U.S. adult population of
245 million, of which Christians accounted for 70.6% (172,970,000) those of non-Christian faiths
were 5.9% (14,455,000), and those who were "unaffiliated" (atheist, agnostic, and "nothing in
particular") were 22.8% (55,860,000). Those of non-Christian faiths and the unaffiliated
aggregate to 28.7%, or 70,315,000).
175. See id. (demonstrating even post Omychund at least almost 56 million American adults
would have been deemed incompetent, using the 22.8% Pew figure for the unaffiliated. This
understates the actual number, by excluding those of non-Christian faiths who would have failed
the Omychund test).
176. R.I. CONST. art. I, § 3.
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They committed to religious liberty, to the proposition that the civil
capacity of a person should not be diminished on account of that person's
religious beliefs:
[W]e, therefore, declare that no person shall ...suffer on account

of such person's religious belief; and that every person shall be
free to worship God according to the dictates of such person's
conscience, and to profess and by argument maintain such person's
opinion in matters of religion; and that the same shall in no177wise
diminish, enlarge, or affect the civil capacity of any person.
The founders observed what results from attempts to impinge on
religious liberty: "Whereas Almighty God hath created the mind free; and
all attempts to influence it by temporal punishments or burdens, or by
civil incapacitations, tend to beget habits of hypocrisy and
meanness... "178

Hypocrisy and meanness. How better to describe a system of witness
oaths and affirmations that, in its earlier incarnation, declared that all nonChristians were unworthy of belief and incompetent to testify in court?
The system that, in its modem incarnation, put Dr. Abbas Husain in a
position where a juror's religious bigotry over how he swore his oath
could have influenced the assessment of his credibility? The system that
refused to let Rawda Musaitef swear on a Quran rather than the Bible?
The system that, in response to Catherine Nicole Donkers' attempt to
explain her religious objection to being forced to raise her right hand and
179
be sworn saw the trial judge respond "you're talking to the wind here"?
We have prohibited the use of religious belief in witness competency
and credibility determinations. But when some witnesses are treated
differently because of their religious beliefs, we run the risk that judges
and jurors will allow religious prejudice to color their credibility
determinations.
We have attempted to accommodate some diversity of religious belief
by providing an affirmation alternative. But when we allow some
witnesses to swear a religious oath compatible with their particular
religious beliefs, but deny other witnesses the same right, we are
implicating the free exercise rights of some of our fellow citizens and
violating the guarantees against religious preferences in most of our state
constitutions.
We have a government that essentially never requires citizens to
disclose their religious beliefs. But when we retain oath and affirmation
practices that require some witnesses to either disclose or violate their
177.
178.

Id.
Id.

179.

Donkers v. Kovach, 745 N.W.2d 154, 156 (Mich. Ct. App., 2007).
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religious beliefs, we are unnecessarily impinging on their privacy on a
matter of great consequence.
To what end do we treat some of our citizens in these ways? The
present system of oaths and affirmations is not required to impose civil
and criminal penalties upon those who fail to tell the truth in judicial
proceedings. The use of witness oaths and affirmations is a vestige of our
prejudiced and exclusionary past, a lingering and unnecessary
entanglement of the justice system and religion.
We should complete our evolution on this issue and eliminate witness
oaths and affirmations in favor of a uniform, non-religious witness
representation. It is time to bid a final farewell to the rewarder of truth
and avenger of falsehood. It is time for our hypocrisy and meanness, on
this small point at least, to end.
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Appendix A - Constitutional Witness Oath Provisions.
1. Arizona. ARIZ. CON. (1912), Art. II., § 7 ("The mode of
administering an oath, or affirmation, shall be such as shall be
most consistent with and binding upon the conscience of the
person to whom such oath, or affirmation, may be
administered.").
2. Indiana. IND. CON. (1851), Art. I., § 8 ("The mode of
administering an oath or affirmation, shall be such as may be
most consistent with, and binding upon, the conscience of the
person, to whom such an oath or affirmation may be
administered.").
3. Kentucky. Ky. CON. (1891), § 232 ("The manner of
administering an oath or affirmation shall be such as is most
consistent with the conscience of the deponent, and shall be
esteemed by the General Assembly the most solemn appeal to
God.").
4. Maryland. MD. CON. (1867), Declaration of Rights, Art. 39
("That the manner of administering an oath or affirmation to
any person, ought to be such as those of the religious
persuasion, profession or denomination, of which he is a
member, generally esteem the most effectual confirmation by
the attestation of the Divine Being.").
5. Oregon. ORE. CON. (1859), Art. I., § 7 ("The mode of
administering an oath, or affirmation shall be such as may be
most consistent with, and binding upon the conscience of the
person to whom such oath or affirmation may be
administered.").
all oaths or
6. Texas. TEX. CON. (1876), Art. I., § 5 ("...
affirmations shall be administered in the mode most binding
upon the conscience, and shall be taken subject to the pains
and penalties of perjury.").
7. Washington. WASH. CON. (1889) Art. I., § 6. ("The mode of
administering an oath, or affirmation, shall be such as may be
most consistent with and binding upon the conscience of the
person to whom such oath, or affirmation, may be
administered.").

Appendix B - Statutory and Rule Witness Oath Provisions.
1. Federal.
a. F.R.C.P., Rule 43(b) ("Affirmation Instead of an Oath. When
these rules require an oath, a solemn affirmation suffices.").
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b. F.R.E., Rule 603 ("Before testifying, a witness must give an
oath or affirmation to testify truthfully. It must be in a form
designed to impress that duty on the witness' conscience.").
Alabama.
a. ALA.R.C.P., Rule 43(d) ("Affirmation in lieu of oath.
Whenever under these rules an oath is required to be taken, a
solemn affirmation may be accepted in lieu thereof. The court
may, but shall not be required to, frame such affirmation
according to the religious faith of the witness.").
b. ALA.R.E., Rule 603 ("Oath or affirmation. Before testifying,
every witness shall be required to declare that the witness will
testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered in a
form calculated to awaken the witness' conscience and
impress the witness' mind with the duty to do so.").
Alaska.
a. AK.R.C.P., Rule 43(d) ("Affirmation in lieu of oath.
Whenever under these rules an oath is required to be taken, a
solemn affirmation may be accepted in lieu thereof.").
b. AK.R.E., Rule 603 ("Oath or Affirmation. Before testifying,
every witness shall be required to declare that the witness will
testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered in a
form calculated to awaken the witness' conscience and
impress the witness' mind with the duty to do so.").
Arizona.
a. ARIz. REv. STAT. § 12-2221.A. ("Manner of administering
oath or affirmation . . . An oath or affirmation shall be
administered in a manner which will best awaken the
conscience and impress the mind of the person taking the oath
or affirmation, and it shall be taken upon the penalty of
perjury.");
and,
ARiz.R.C.P.SuP.CT.,
Rule
43(b)
("Affirmation in Lieu of Oath. Whenever under these Rules
an oath is required to be taken, a solemn affirmation may be
accepted in lieu thereof.").
b. ARIz.R.E., Rule 603 ("Oath or Affirmation to Testify
Truthfully. Before testifying, a witness must give an oath or
affirmation to testify truthfully. It must be in a form designed
to impress that duty on the witness' conscience.").
Arkansas.
a. ARK. CODE § 16-2-101 (a) ("The usual mode of administering
oaths practiced by the person who swears, laying his or her
hand on and kissing the Gospels, shall be observed in all cases
in which an oath is or may be required by law to be
administered, except as otherwise provided in this chapter."),
(b) ("Every person who shall desire it shall be permitted to
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swear with an uplifted hand in the following form: 'You do
solemnly swear, etc."'), (c) ("Every person who shall declare
that he or she has conscientious scruples against taking an oath
or swearing in any form shall be permitted to make his or her
solemn declaration or affirmation in the following form: 'You
do solemnly and truly declare and affirm'."), (d) ("Whenever
the court or magistrate by whom any person is about to be
sworn, shall be satisfied that the person has any peculiar mode
of swearing connected with or in addition to any of the forms
mentioned in this section, which mode is more solemn and
obligatory in the opinion of the person, the court or magistrate
may adopt that mode of swearing."), (e) Every person
believing in any religion other than the Christian religion shall
be sworn according to the peculiar ceremonies of his or her
religion, if there are any such ceremonies, instead of any of
the other modes prescribed in this section.").
b. ARK.R.C.P., Rule 43(b) ("Affirmation in Lieu of Oath.
Whenever under these rules an oath is required to be taken, a
solemn affirmation may be accepted in lieu thereof.").
c. ARK.R.E., Rule 603 ("Oath or Affirmation. Before testifying,
every witness shall be required to declare that he will testify
truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered in a form
calculated to awaken his conscience and impress his mind
with his duty to do so.").
6. California.
a. CAL. CODE CIv. PRO. § 2094 ("(a) An oath, affirmation, or
declaration in an action or a proceeding, may be administered
by obtaining an affirmative response to one of the following
questions: (1) 'Do you solemnly state that the evidence you
shall give in this issue (or matter) shall be the truth, the whole
truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?' (2) 'Do you
solemnly state, under penalty of perjury, that the evidence that
you shall give in this issue (or matter) shall be the truth, the
whole truth, and nothing but the truth?' (b) In the alternative
to the forms prescribed in subdivision (a), the court may
administer an oath, affirmation, or declaration in an action or
a proceeding in a manner that is calculated to awaken the
person's conscience and impress the person's mind with the
duty to tell the truth. The court shall satisfy itself that the
person testifying understands that his or her testimony is being
given under penalty of perjury.").
b. CAL.E.C. § 710 ("Every witness before testifying shall take
an oath or make an affirmation or declaration in the form
provided by law...").

486
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7. Colorado.

a. CoL.R.S. § 13-90-117. ("Affirmation - form- perjury. (1) A
witness who desires it, at his option, instead of taking an oath
may make his solemn affirmation or declaration by assenting
when addressed in the following form: 'You do solemnly
affirm that the evidence you shall give in this issue (or matter),
pending between .......
and .......
shall be the truth, the whole
truth, and nothing but the truth.' (2) Assent to this affirmation
shall be made by answer: 'I do.' (3) A false affirmation or
declaration is perjury in the first degree.").
b. CoL.R.E., Rule 603 ("Oath or Affirmation. Before testifying,
every witness shall be required to declare that he will testify
truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered in a form
calculated to awaken his conscience and impress his mind
with his duty to do so.").
8. Connecticut.
a. 43 CONN. GEN. STAT. Tit. 1, § 1-22 ("Ceremony. The
ceremony to be used, by persons to whom an oath is
administered, shall be the holding up of the right hand; but
when any person, by reason of scruples of conscience, objects
to such ceremony or when the court or authority by whom the
oath is to be administered has reason to believe that any other
ceremony will be more binding upon the conscience of the
witness, such court or authority may permit or require any
other ceremony to be used."), §1-23 ("When affirmation may
be used. When any person, required to take an oath, from
scruples of conscience declines to take it in the usual form or
when the court is satisfied that any person called as a witness
does not believe in the existence of a Supreme Being, a
solemn affirmation may be administered to him in the form of
the oath prescribed, except that instead of the word "swear"
the words "solemnly and sincerely affirm and declare" shall
be used and instead of the words "so help you God" the words
"upon the pains and penalties of perjury or false statement"
shall be used."), § 1-25 ("Forms of oath. The forms of oaths
shall be as follows, to wit: ...For witnesses. You solemnly

swear or solemnly and sincerely affirm, as the case may be,
that the evidence you shall give concerning this case shall be
the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth; so help
you God or upon penalty of perjury.").
b. CT.C.E. § 6-2 ("Oath or Affirmation. Before testifying, every
witness shall be required to declare that the witness will testify
truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered in a form
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calculated to awaken the witness' conscience and impress the
witness' mind with the duty to do so.").
9. Delaware.
a. DEL. CODE Tit. 10, § 5321 ("Method of administering. The
usual oath in this State shall be by swearing upon the Holy
Evangels of Almighty God. The person to whom an oath is
administered shall lay his or her right hand upon the book."),
§ 5322 ("Uplifted hand. A person may be permitted to swear
with the uplifted hand; that is to say, a person shall lift up his
or her right hand and swear by the ever living God, the
searcher of all hearts, that etc., and at the end of the oath shall
say, 'as I shall answer to God at the Great Day."'), § 5323
("Affirmation. A person conscientiously scrupulous of taking
an oath may be permitted, instead of swearing, solemnly,
sincerely and truly to declare and affirm to the truth of the
matters to be testified."), § 5324 ("Non-Christians. A person
believing in any other than the Christian religion, may be
sworn according to the peculiar ceremonies of such person's
religion, if there be any such.").
b. DEL.R.C.P.SuP.CT. Rule 43(c) ("Affirmation in lieu of oath.
-- Whenever under these Rules an oath is required to be taken,
a solemn affirmation may be accepted in lieu thereof.").
c. DEL.R.E., Rule 603 ("Oath or affirmation. Before testifying,
every witness shall be required to declare that he will testify
truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered in a form
calculated to awaken his conscience and impress his mind
with his duty to do so.").
10. Florida.
a. FLA. STAT. § 90.605(1) ("Oath or affirmation of witness.--(1)
Before testifying, each witness shall declare that he or she will
testify truthfully, by taking an oath or affirmation in
substantially the following form: 'Do you swear or affirm that
the evidence you are about to give will be the truth, the whole
truth, and nothing but the truth?' The witness' answer shall be
noted in the record.").
b. FLA. STAT. § 92.52 ("Affirmation equivalent to oath.Whenever an oath shall be required by any law of this state in
any proceeding, an affirmation may be substituted therefor.").
Georgia.
11.
a. Ga. Code § 24-6-603 ("Oath or affirmation. (a).Before
testifying, every witness shall be required to declare that he or
she will testify truthfully by oath or affirmation administered
in a form calculated to awaken the witness' conscience and
impress the witness' mind with the duty to do so.").
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b. O.C.G.A. § 24-9-60 ("Oath or affirmation required. The
sanction of an oath or affirmation equivalent thereto shall be
necessary to the reception of any oral evidence. The court may
frame such affirmation according to the religious faith of the
witness.").
12. Hawaii.
a. HA.R.C.P., Rule 43(d) ("Affirmation in lieu of oath.
Whenever under these rules an oath is required to be taken, a
solemn affirmation may be accepted in lieu thereof.").
b. HA.C. § 33.626, Rule 603 ("Oath or affirmation. Before
testifying, every witness shall be required to declare that the
witness will testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation
administered in a form calculated to awaken the witness'
conscience and impress the witness' mind with the witness'
duty to do so.").
13. Idaho.
a. ID.R.C.P., Rule 43(d) ("Affirmation in Lieu of Oath.
Whenever under these rules an oath is required to be taken,
a solemn affirmation may be accepted in lieu thereof.").
b. ID.R.E., Rule 603 ("Oath or Affirmation. Before testifying,
every witness shall be required to declare that the witness will
testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered in
a form calculated to awaken the conscience of the witness and
impress upon the mind of the witness of the duty to do so.").
14. Illinois.
a. 5 ILCS 255/0.01 ("Sec. 3. Whenever any person shall be
required to take an oath before he enters upon the discharge
of any office, place or business, or on any other lawful
occasion, it shall be lawful for any person empowered to
administer the oath to administer it in the following form, towit: The person swearing shall, with his hand uplifted, swear
by the ever-living God, and shall not be compelled to lay the
hand on or kiss the gospels. Sec. 4. Whenever any person
required to take or subscribe an oath, as aforesaid, and in all
cases where an oath is upon any lawful occasion to be
administered, and such person shall have conscientious
scruples against taking an oath, he shall be admitted, instead
of taking an oath, to make his solemn affirmation or
declaration in the following form to-wit: You do solemnly,
sincerely and truly declare and affirm. Which solemn
affirmation or declaration shall be equally valid as if such
person had taken an oath in the usual form; and every person
guilty of falsely and corruptly declaring, as aforesaid, shall
incur and suffer the like pains and penalties as are or shall be
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inflicted on persons convicted of willful
perjury.").

15.

16.

17.

18.

and corrupt

b. ILL.R.E., Rule 603 ("Oath or Affirmation. Before testifying,
every witness shall be required to declare that the witness will
testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation, administered in a
form calculated to awaken the witness' conscience and
impress the witness' mind with the duty to do so.").
Indiana.
a. IND. CODE § 34-45-1-2 ("Before testifying, every witness
shall be sworn to testify the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth. The mode of administering an oath must be the
most consistent with and binding upon the conscience of the
person to whom the oath may be administered.").
b. IND.R.E., Rule 603 ("Oath or Affirmation to Testify
Truthfully. Before testifying, a witness must give an oath or
affirmation to testify truthfully. It must be in a form designed
to impress that duty on the witness' conscience.").
Iowa.
a.
IA. R. EVIDENCE Rule 5.603 ("Oath or affirmation. Before
testifying, every witness shall be required to declare that the
witness will testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered
in a form calculated to awaken the witness' conscience and
impress the witness' mind with the witness' duty to do so.").
Kansas.
a. KAN. STAT. § 54-102 ("How administered. All oaths shall be
administered by laying the right hand upon the Holy Bible, or
by the uplifted right hand."), § 54-103 ("Persons having
conscientious scruples may affirm. Any person having
conscientious scruples against taking an oath, may affirm with
like effect."), § 54-104 ("Form of commencement and
conclusion of oaths. All oaths shall commence and conclude
as follows: 'You do solemnly swear,' etc.; 'So help you God.'
Affirmation shall commence and conclude as follows: 'You
do solemnly, sincerely and truly declare and affirm,' etc.;
'And this you do under the pains and penalties of perjury."').
b. KAN.C. § 60-418 ("Oath. Every witness before testifying shall
be required to express his or her purpose to testify by the oath
or affirmation required by law.").
Kentucky.
a. KY. REV. STAT. § 454.170 ("Substitution of affirmation for
oath. An oath required by any statute derived from the former
Civil Code, or by the Rules of Civil Procedure may be
substituted by the affirmation of a person who is
conscientiously opposed to taking an oath.").
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b. KY. R. EvID. Rule 603 ("Oath or affirmation. Before
testifying, every witness shall be required to declare that the
witness will testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation
administered in a form calculated to awaken the witness'
conscience and impress the witness' mind with the duty to do
SO.").

19. Louisiana.
a. LA.C.C.P. Art. 1633 ("Oath or affirmation of witnesses;
refusal to testify. A. Before testifying, every witness shall be
required to declare that he will testify truthfully, by oath or
affirmation administered in a form calculated to awaken his
conscience and impress his mind with his duty to do so. B. A
witness who appears but refuses to testify without proper
cause shall be considered in contempt of court.").
b. LA. C.CR.P. Art. 14 ("Oath or affirmation in criminal
proceedings; witness. A. If a person refuses to take an oath or
to make a sworn statement or affidavit required in connection
with any criminal proceedings, he may affirm in lieu of
swearing, and his affirmation shall fulfill the requirement and
shall have the same legal effect as an oath, sworn statement,
or affidavit. B. Before testifying every witness shall be
required to declare that he will testify truthfully, by oath or
affirmation administered in a form calculated to awaken his
conscience and impress his mind with his duty to do so.").
c. LA. R. E. Art. 603. ("Oath or affirmation. Before testifying,
every witness shall be required to declare that he will testify
truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered in a form
calculated to awaken his conscience and impress his mind
with his duty to do so.").
20. Maine.
a. ME. REv. STATE., Tit. 17., Ch. 1., § 151 ("Oaths. A person to
whom an oath is administered shall hold up his hand unless
he believes that an oath administered in that form is not
binding, and then it may be administered in a form believed
by him to be binding. One believing any other than the
Christian religion may be sworn according to the ceremonies
of his religion."), and § 152 ("Affirmation. Persons
conscientiously scrupulous of taking an oath may affirm as
follows: 'I affirm under the pains and penalties of perjury,'
which affirmation is of the same force and effect as an oath.").
b. ME.R.C.P., Rule 43(d) ("Affirmation in Lieu of Oath.
Whenever under these rules an oath is required to be taken, a
solemn affirmation may be accepted in lieu thereof.").
c. ME.R.E., Rule 603 ("Oath or Affirmation to Testify
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Truthfully. Before testifying, a witness must give an oath or
affirmation to testify truthfully. The oath or affirmation must
be in a form designed to impress that duty on the witness'
conscience.").
21. Maryland.
a. Md. Rules, Tit. 1, § 303 ("Form of oath. Except as provided
in Rule 1-333 (c)(3), whenever an oral oath is required by rule
or law, the person making oath shall solemnly swear or affirm
under the penalties of perjury that the responses given and
statements made will be the whole truth and nothing but the
truth. A written oath shall be in a form provided in Rule I 304.").
b. MD.R., Rule 5-603 ("Oath or Affirmation. Before testifying,
a witness shall be required to declare that the witness will
testify truthfully. The declaration shall be by oath or
affirmation administered either in the form specified by Rule
1-303 or, in special circumstances, in some other form of oath
or affirmation calculated to impress upon the witness the'duty
to tell the truth.").
22. Massachusetts.
a. MAss. GEN. L. PT. IlI., Tit. I, Ch. 233., § 15 ("The usual mode
of administering oaths now practiced in the commonwealth.
with the ceremony of holding up the hand, shall be observed
in all cases in which an oath may be administered by law,
except as provided in sections sixteen to nineteen,
inclusive."), § 16 ("If a person to be sworn declares that a
different mode of taking the oath is in his opinion more
solemn and obligatory than the upholding of the hand, the oath
may be administered in such mode."), § 17 ("A Friend or
Quaker when called on to take an oath may solemnly and
sincerely affirm under the penalties of perjury."), § 18 ("A
person who declares that he has conscientious scruples against
taking an oath shall, when called upon for that purpose, be
permitted to affirm in the maimer prescribed for Quakers, if
the court or magistrate on inquiry is satisfied of the truth of
such declaration."), and § 19 ("A person believing in any other
than the Christian religion may be sworn according to the
appropriate ceremonies of his religion. A person not a believer
in any religion shall be required to testify truly under the
penalties of perjury, and evidence of his disbelief in the
existence of God may not be received to affect his credibility
as a witness.").
b. MAss.Clv.P.R., Rule(d) ("Affirmation in Lieu of Oath.
Whenever under these rules an oath is required to be taken, a
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solemn affirmation under the penalties of perjury may be
accepted in lieu thereof.").
c. MAss.R.E., § 603 ("Oath or Affirmation to Testify Truthfully.
Before testifying, a witness must give an oath or affirmation
to testify truthfully. It must be in a form designed to impress
that duty on the witness' conscience.").
23. Michigan.
a. MICH. C. L. § 600.1432(1) ("The usual mode of administering
oaths now practiced in this state, by the person who swears
holding up the right hand, shall be observed in all cases in
which an oath may be administered by law except as
otherwise provided by law. The oath shall commence, 'You
do solemnly swear or affirm."'), and, § 600.1434 ("Every
person conscientiously opposed to taking an oath may, instead
of swearing, solemnly and sincerely affirm, under the pains
and penalties of perjury.").
b. MICH.R.E., Rule 603 ("Oath or Affirmation. Before
testifying, every witness shall be required to declare that the
witness will testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation
administered in a form calculated to awaken the witness'
conscience and impress the witness' mind with the duty to do
so.").

24. Minnesota.
a. MN. STAT. § 358.07 ("An oath substantially in the following
forms shall be administered to the respective officers and
persons hereinafter named: .

.

. (7) To witnesses: 'You do

swear that the evidence you shall give relative to the cause
now under consideration shall be the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth. So help you God."'); § 358.08 ("If any person of
whom an oath is required shall claim religious scruples
against taking the same, the word 'swear' and the words 'so
help you God' may be omitted from the foregoing forms, and
the word 'affirm' and the words 'and this you do under the
penalties of perjury' shall be substituted therefor,
respectively, and such person shall be considered, for all
purposes, as having been duly sworn.").
b. MiNN.R.C.P., Rule 43.04 ("Affirmation in Lieu of Oath.
Whenever under these rules an oath is required to be taken, a
solemn affirmation may be accepted in lieu thereof.").
c. MmN.R.E., Rule 603 ("Oath or Affirmation. Before
testifying, every witness shall be required to declare that the
witness will testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation
administered in a form calculated to awaken the witness'
conscience and impress the witness' mind with the duty to do
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so.").
25. Mississippi.
a. Miss. R. CtV. PRO. § 43(d) ("Affirmation in Lieu of Oath.
Whenever under these rules an oath is required to be taken, a
solemn affirmation may be accepted in lieu thereof.").
b. Miss.R.E., Rule 603 ("Oath or Affirmation. Before testifying,
every witness shall be required to declare that he will testify
truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered in a form
calculated to awaken his conscience and impress his mind
with his duty to do so.").
26. Missouri.
a. Mo. REv. STAT. § 491.380.1 ("Every person offered as a
witness, before any testimony shall be given by him, shall be
duly sworn, or affirmed., that the evidence he shall give
relating to the matter in issue between
, plaintiff
and
, defendant, shall be the truth, the whole
truth, and nothing but the truth.").
27. Montana.
a. MONT. CODE ANN. § 1-6-102 ("Form of ordinary oath. An
oath or affirmation in an action or proceeding may be
administered by the person who swears or affirms expressing
that person's assent when addressed with 'You do solemnly
swear (or affirm, as the case may be) that the evidence you
will give in this issue (or matter), pending between ....and.
...,is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so
help you God."'), § 1-6-103. Variation of oath to suit witness'
belief ("The court shall vary the mode of swearing or
affirming to accord with the witness' beliefs whenever it is
satisfied that the witness has a distinct mode of swearing or
affirming."), and 1-6-104 ("Affirmation or declaration in lieu
of oath. Any person who desires it may instead of taking an
oath make a solemn affirmation or declaration by assenting
when addressed with 'You do solemnly affirm (or declare),
etc.,' as provided in 1-6-102.").
b. MONT.R.C.P., Rule 43(b) ("Affirmation Instead of an Oath.
When these rules require an oath, a solemn affirmation
suffices.").
c. MONT.CODE Tit. 26, Rule 603 ("Oath or affirmation. Before
testifying, every witness shall be required to declare that the
witness will testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation
administered in a form calculated to awaken the witness'
conscience and impress the witness' mind with the duty to do
so.").
28. Nebraska.
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a. NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-2220 ("Oaths and affirmations.
Whenever an oath is required by this code, the affirmation of
a person conscientiously scrupulous of taking an oath, shall
have the same effect.").
b. NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-603 ("Oath or affirmation. Before
testifying, every witness shall be required to declare that he
will testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered in a
form calculated to awaken his conscience and impress his
mind with his duty to do so.").
29. Nevada.
a. NRS § 50.035 ("Oath or affirmation. 1. Before testifying,
every witness shall be required to declare that he or she will
testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered in a
form calculated to awaken his or her conscience and impress
his or her mind with the duty to do so. 2. An affirmation is
sufficient if the witness is addressed in the following terms:
'You do solemnly affirm that the evidence you shall give in
this issue (or matter), pending between ................
and
................
,shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
the truth.' Assent to this affirmation shall be made by the
answer, 'I do.').
b. NEv.R.C.P., Rule 43(b) ("Affirmation in Lieu of Oath.
Whenever under these rules an oath is required to be taken, a
solemn affirmation may be accepted in lieu thereof.").
c. NEV.R.STAT. § 50.035 ("Oath or affirmation. 1. Before
testifying, every witness shall be required to declare that he or
she will testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered
in a form calculated to awaken his or her conscience and
impress his or her mind with the duty to do so. 2. An
affirmation is sufficient if the witness is addressed in the
following terms: 'You do solemnly affirm that the evidence
you shall give in this issue (or matter), pending between
................
and ................
, shall be the truth, the whole truth,

and nothing but the truth.' Assent to this affirmation shall be
made by the answer, 'I do."').
30. New Hampshire.
a. N.H. STAT. § 516:19 ("Swearing.- No other ceremony shall
be necessary in swearing than holding up the right hand, but
any other form or ceremony may be used which the person to
whom the oath is administered professes to believe more
binding upon the conscience."), and §516:20 ("Affirmation. Persons scrupulous of swearing may affirm; the word 'affirm'
being used in administering the oath, instead of the word
'swear,' and the words 'this you do under the pains and
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penalties of perjury,' instead of the words 'So help you
God"').
b. N.H.R.E., Rule 603 ("Oath or Affirmation. Before testifying,
every witness shall be required to declare that he or she will
testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered in a
form calculated to awaken the conscience and impress his or
her mind with the duty to do so.").
31. New Jersey.
a. N.J.R.E., Rule 603 ("Oath or Affirmation. Before testifying a
witness shall be required to take an oath or make an
affirmation or declaration to tell the truth under the penalty
provided by law. No witness may be barred from testifying
because of religious belief or lack of such belief.").
32. New Mexico.
a. N.M. STAT. § 31-6-6 ("Oaths ... A. The following oaths shall
be administered.. . by the foreman to witnesses: ... (3) FOR
WITNESS: 'You do swear (or affirm) that the testimony
which you are about to give will be the truth, so help you
God."').
b. N.M.R.C.P., Rule 2.601.C. ("Oath of witnesses. The
magistrate shall administer the following oath to each witness:
'You do solemnly swear (or affirm) that the testimony you
give is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth
under penalty of perjury?').
c. N.MEx.R.E., Rule 11-603 ("Oath or Affirmation to Testify
Truthfully. Before testifying, a witness must give an oath or
affirmation to testify truthfully. It must be in a form designed
to impress that duty on the witness' conscience.").
33. New York.
a. N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 2309(b) (McKinney 2015) ("Form. An oath or
affirmation shall be administered in a form calculated to
awaken the conscience and impress the mind of the person
taking it in accordance with his religious or ethical beliefs.").
34. North Carolina.
a. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 11-1 ("Oaths and affirmations to be
administered with solemnity. Whereas, lawful oaths for
discovery of truth and establishing right are necessary and
highly conducive to the important end of good government;
and being most solemn appeals to Almighty God, as the
omniscient witness of truth and the just and omnipotent
avenger of falsehood, and whereas, lawful affirmations for the
discovery of truth and establishing right are necessary and
highly conducive to the important end of good government,
therefore, such oaths and affirmations ought to be taken and
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administered with the utmost solemnity."), § 11-2
("Administration of oaths. Judges and other persons who may
be empowered to administer oaths, shall (except in the cases
in this Chapter excepted) require the party to be sworn to lay
his hand upon the Holy Scriptures, in token of his engagement
to speak the truth and in further token that, if he should swerve
from the truth, he may be justly deprived of all the blessings
of that holy book and made liable to that vengeance which he
has imprecated on his own head."), § 11-3 ("Administration
of oath with uplifted hand. When the person to be sworn shall
be conscientiously scrupulous of taking a book oath in manner
aforesaid, he shall be excused from laying hands upon, or
touching the Holy Gospel; and the oath required shall be
administered in the following manner, namely: He shall stand
with his right hand lifted up towards heaven, in token of his
solemn appeal to the Supreme God, and also in token that if
he should swerve from the truth he would draw down the
vengeance of heaven upon his head, and shall introduce the
intended oath with these words, namely: I, A.B., do appeal to
God, as a witness of the truth and the avenger of falsehood, as
I shall answer the same at the great day ofjudgment, when the
secrets of all hearts shall be known (etc., as the words of the
oath may be."), and § 11-4 ("Affirmation in lieu of oath. When
a person to be sworn shall have conscientious scruples against
taking an oath in the manner prescribed by G.S. 11-2, 11-3, or
11-7, he shall be permitted to be affirmed. In all cases the
words of the affirmation shall be the same as the words of the
prescribed oath, except that the word 'affirm' shall be
substituted for the word 'swear' and the words 'so help me
God' shall be deleted.").
b. N.C.STAT. § 8C-1, Rule 603 ("Oath or affirmation. Before
testifying, every witness shall be required to declare that he
will testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered in a
form calculated to awaken his conscience and impress his
mind with his duty to do so.").
35. North Dakota.
a. N.D. CENT. C. § 1-01-49.4. ("'Oath' includes 'affirmation.').
b. N.D. CENT. CODE, N.D. R.E., Rule 603 ("Oath or Affirmation.
Before testifying, a witness must give an oath or affirmnation
to testify truthfully. It must be in a form designed to impress
that duty on the witness' conscience.").
36. Ohio.
a. OHIO R.E., Rule 603 ("Oath or Affirmation. Before testifying,
every witness shall be required to declare that the witness will
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testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered in a
form calculated to awaken the witness' conscience and
impress the witness' mind with the duty to do so.").
37. Oklahoma.
a. OK. STAT. § 12-72 ("Affirmation. Whenever an oath is
required by this Code, the affirmation of a person,
conscientiously scrupulous of taking an oath shall have the
same effect.").
b. OK. STAT. § 12-849 (Examination under oath - answer by
corporation. The party or witness may be required to attend
before the judge, or before a referee appointed by the judge..
.All examinations and answers before a judge or a referee
must be on oath.").
c. OK.R.C.P. § 12-2603 ("Oath or affirmation. Every witness
shall be required to declare before testifying that the witness
will testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered in a
form calculated to awaken the witness' conscience and
impress the witness' mind with the duty to do so.").
38. Oregon.
a. OR. REV. STAT. § 40.320 ("(1) Before testifying, every
witness shall be required to declare that the witness will testify
truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered in a form
calculated to awaken the conscience of the witness and
impress the mind of the witness with the duty to do so. (2) An
oath may be administered as follows: The person who swears
holds up one hand while the person administering the oath
asks: Under penalty of perjury, do you solemnly swear that
the evidence you shall give in the issue (or matter) now
shall be the truth, the
__
and __
pending between
whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God? If the
oath is administered to any other than a witness, the same form
and manner may be used. The person swearing must answer
in an affirmative manner. (3) An affirmation may be
administered as follows: The person who affirms holds Lip one
hand while the person administering the affirmation asks:
Under penalty of perjury, do you promise that the evidence
you shall give in the issue (or matter) now pending between
shall be the truth, the whole truth and
and
nothing but the truth? If the affirmation is administered to any
other than a witness, the same form and manner may be used.
'The person affirming must answer in an affirmative
manner.").
Pennsylvania.
39.
a. PA. STAT. § 5901 ("Judicial oath (a) General rule.--Every
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witness, before giving any testimony shall take an oath in the
usual or common form, by laying the hand upon an open copy
of the Holy Bible, or by lifting up the right hand and
pronouncing or assenting to the following words: 'I, A. B., do
swear by Almighty God, the searcher of all hearts, that I will,
and that as I shall answer to God at the last great day.' Which
oath so taken by persons who conscientiously refuse to take
an oath in the common form shall be deemed and taken in law
to have the same effect as an oath taken in common form. (b)
Right to affirm.--The affirmation may be administered in any
judicial proceeding instead of the oath, and shall have the
same effect and consequences, and any witness who desires
to affirm shall be permitted to do so.").
b. PA.R.C.P., Rule 76. ("Definitions . . . Oath-Includes
affirmation.").
c. PA.CODE Tit. 225, Rule 603 ("Oath or Affirmation to Testify
Truthfully. Before testifying, a witness must give an oath or
affirmation to testify truthfully. It must be in a form designed
to impress that duty on the witness' conscience.").
40. Rhode Island.
a. R.I. SUP.CT. R.C.P. Rule 43(b) ("Affirmation in Lieu of Oath.
Whenever under these rules an oath is required to be taken, a
solemn affirmation may be accepted in lieu thereof.").
b. R.I. DIST.CT. R.C.P. Rule 43(d) ("Affirmation in Lieu of
Oath. Whenever under these rules an oath is required to be
taken, a solemn affirmation may be accepted in lieu thereof.").
41. South Carolina.
a. S.C.R.C.P., Rule 43(d) ("Affirmation in Lieu of Oath.
Whenever under these rules an oath is required to be taken, a
solemn affirmation may be accepted in lieu thereof.").
b. S.C.R.E., Rule 603 ("Oath or Affirmation. Before testifying,
every witness shall be required to declare that the witness will
testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered in a
form calculated to awaken the witness' conscience and
impress the witness' mind with the duty to do so.").
42. South Dakota.
a. S.D.C.L. § 18-3-5 ("Affirmation in lieu of oath. Persons
conscientiously opposed to swearing may affirm, and shall be
subject to the penalties of perjury as in case of swearing."),
§ 19-19-603.1 ("Form for oath of witness. The following oath
may be used to satisfy the requirements of § 19-19-603: You
do solemnly swear that the evidence you shall give relative to
the matter in difference now in hearing between _,
plaintiff, and __,
defendant, shall be the truth, the whole
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43.

44.

45.

46.

truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God."), and § 1919-603.2 ("Form for affirmation of witness. The following
affirmation may be used to satisfy the requirements of § 1919-603: You do solemnly affirm that the evidence you shall
give relative to the matter in difference now in hearing
, plaintiff, and __, defendant, shall be the
between __
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth under the pains
and penalties of perjury.").
b. S.D.CoD.L. § 19-14-3, Rule 603 ("Oath or affirmation of
witness. Before testifying, every witness shall be required to
declare that he will testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation
administered in a form calculated to awaken his conscience
and impress his mind with his duty to do so.").
Tennessee.
a. TN.R.E., Rule 603 ("Before testifying, every witness shall be
required to declare that the witness will testify truthfully by
oath or affirmation, administered in a form calculated to
awaken the witness' conscience and impress the witness'
mind with the duty to do so.").
Texas.
a. TEx.R.E., Rule 603 ("Oath or Affirmation to Testify
Truthfully. Before testifying, a witness must give an oath or
affirmation to testify truthfully. It must be in a form designed
to impress that duty on the witness' conscience.").
Utah.
a. Utah Code, Tit. 78B, Ch. 1, § 143 ("Witnesses- Form of oath.
An oath or affirmation in an action or proceeding may be
administered in the following form: You do solemnly swear
(or affirm) that the evidence you shall give in this issue (or
and
between
pending
matter)
shall be the truth, the whole truth and
nothing but the truth, so help you God (or, under the pains and
penalties of perjury). The person swearing or affirming shall
express assent when addressed.").
b. U.R.E., Rule 603 ("Oath or Affirmation to Testify Truthfully.
Before testifying, a witness must give an oath or affirmation
to testify truthfully. It must be in a form designed to impress
that duty on the witness' conscience.").
Vermont.
a. 12 V.S.A. § 581.0 ("Oath to be administered to witnesses. You
solemnly swear that the evidence you shall give, relative to
the cause now under consideration, shall be the whole truth
and nothing but the truth. So help you God."), and § 5851
("Affirmation. In the administration of an oath, the word
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'swear' may be omitted, and the word 'affirm' substituted,
when the person to whom the obligation is administered is
religiously scrupulous of swearing, or taking an oath in the
prescribed form; and, in such case, the words 'so help you
God' may be omitted, and the words 'under the pains and
penalties of perjury' substituted; and a person so affirming
shall be considered, for every legal purpose of privilege,
qualification or liability, as having been duly sworn.").
b. VT.R.E., Rule 603 ("Oath or Affirmation. Before testifying,
every witness shall be required to declare that he will testify
truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered in a form
calculated to awaken his conscience and impress his min with
his duty to do so.").
47. Virginia.
a. Code Va. § 49-9 ("When affirmation may be made. If any
person required to take an oath shall declare that he has
religious scruples as to the propriety of taking it, he may make
a solemn affirmation, which shall in all respects have the same
effect as an oath."), and § 49-10 ("Use of Bible in
administration of oaths. No officer of this Commonwealth, or
any political subdivision thereof, shall, in administering an
oath in pursuance of law, require or request any person taking
the oath to kiss the Holy Bible, or any book or books thereof,
but persons being sworn for any purpose may be required to
place their hand on the Holy Bible. Any officer violating this
section shall be subject to a fine of $100.").
b. VA.R.E., Rule 2:603 ("Oath or Affirmation. Before testifying,
every witness shall be required to declare that he or she will
testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered in a
form calculated to awaken the conscience and impress the
mind of the witness with the duty to do so.").
48. Washington.
a. RCW § 5.28.030 ("Form may be varied. Whenever the court
or officer before which a person is offered as a witness is
satisfied that he or she has a peculiar mode of swearing
connected with or in addition to the usual form of
administration, which, in witness' opinion, is more solemn or
obligatory, the court or officer may, in its discretion, adopt
that mode."), § 5.28.040 ("Form may be adapted to religious
belief. When a person is sworn who believes in any other than
the Christian religion, he or she may be sworn according to
the peculiar ceremonies of his or her religion, if there be any
such."), § 5.28.050 ("Form of affirmation. Any person who
has conscientious scruples against taking an oath, may make
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his or her solemn affirmation, by assenting, when addressed,
in the following manner: 'You do solemnly affirm that,' etc.,
as in RCW 5.28.020."), and § 5.28.060 ("Affirmation
equivalent to oath. Whenever an oath is required, an
affirmation, as prescribed in RCW 5.28.050 is to be deemed
equivalent thereto, and a false affirmation is to be deemed
perjury, equally with a false oath.").
b. WASH.CT.R., Rule ER 603 ("Oath or Affirmation. Before
testifying, every witness shall be required to declare that the
witness will testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation
administered in a form calculated to awaken the witness'
conscience and impress the witness' mind with the duty to do
so.").
49. West Virginia.
a. W.VA.R.C.P., Rule 43(d) ("Affirmation in lieu of oath.
Whenever under these rules an oath is required to be taken, a
solemn affirmation may be accepted in lieu thereof."). ,
b. W.VA.R.E., Rule 603 ("Oath or Affirmation to Testify
Truthfully. Before testifying, a witness must give an oath or
affirmation to testify truthfully. It must be in a form designed
to impress that duty on the witness' conscience.").
50. Wisconsin.
a. WIs. STAT. § 906.03 ("Oath or affirmation. (1) Before
testifying, every witness shall be required to declare that the
witness will testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation
administered in a form calculated to awaken the witness'
conscience and impress the witness' mind with the witness'
duty to do so. (2) The oath may be administered substantially
in the following form: Do you solemnly swear that the
testimony you shall give in this matter shall be the truth, the
whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God. (3)
Every person who shall declare that the person has
conscientious scruples against taking the oath, or swearing in
the usual form, shall make a solemn declaration or
affirmation, which may be in the following form: Do you
solemnly, sincerely and truly declare and affirm that the
testimony you shall give in this matter shall be the truth, the
whole truth and nothing but the truth; and this you do under
the pains and penalties of perjury. (4) The assent to the oath
or affirmation by the person making it may be manifested by
the uplifted hand.").
51. Wyoming.
a. WY. STAT. § 1-2-101 ("Form. A person may be sworn by any
form he deems binding on his conscience."), § 1-2-103
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("Affirmation in lieu of oath; manner of administering.
Persons conscientiously opposed to swearing or to taking any
oath may affirm, and are subject to the penalties of perjury as
in the case of swearing an oath. Whenever any person is
required to take an oath in any court, or before any person or
officer authorized by law to administer oaths, it is lawful for
the court, officer or person administering the same, to
administer it in the following manner: the person taking the
oath or swearing shall, with his or her right hand uplifted,
swear or take the oath, concluding with the words 'so help me
God'.").
b. Wyo.R.E., Rule 603 ("Oath or affirmation. Before testifying,
every witness shall be required to declare that he will testify
truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered in a form
calculated to awaken his conscience and impress his mind
with his duty to do so.").
Appendix C - Constitutional Guarantees Against
Religious Preferences.
1. Alabama. ALA. CON. art. 1, § 3 ("... that no preference shall be
given by law to any religious sect, society, denomination, or mode
of worship. ..").
2. Arkansas. ARK. CON. art. 2, § 24 ("... no preference shall ever
be given, by law, to any religious establishment, denomination or
mode of worship, above any other.").
3. California. CAL. CON. art. I, § 4 ("The free exercise and
enjoyment of religious jprofession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be guaranteed in this
State...").
4. Colorado. COLO. CON. art. II, § 4 ("The free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination, shall forever hereafter be guaranteed... Nor shall
any preference be given by law to any religious denomination or
mode of worship.").
5. Connecticut. CONN. CON. art. I, § 3 ("The exercise and enjoyment
of religious profession and worship, without discrimination, shall
forever be free to all persons in the state...").
6. Delaware. DEL. CON. art. I, § I ("... nor a preference given by
law to any religious societies, denominations, or modes of
worship.").
7. Idaho. IDAHO CON. art. I, § 4("... nor shall any preference be
given by law to any religious denomination or mode of
worship.").
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8. Illinois. ILL. CON. art. 1, § 3 (". . . nor shall any preference be
given by law to any religious denomination or mode of
worship.").
9. Indiana. IND. CON. art. I, § 4 ("No preference shall be given, by
law, to any creed, religious society, or mode of worship...").
10. Kansas. KAN. CON. Bill of Rights, § 7 (". . . nor shall any
preference be given by law to any religious establishment or mode
of worship.").
11. Kentucky. KY. CON. Bill of Rights, § 5 ("No preference shall ever
be given by law to any religious sect, society or denomination;
nor to any particular creed, mode of worship or system of
ecclesiastical polity... ").
12. Maine. ME. CON. ART.I, § 3 ("... no subordination nor preference
of any one sect or denomination to another shall ever be
established by law...").
13. Massachusetts. MASS. CON. Articles of Amendment, art. XI ("...
and all religious sects and denominations, demeaning themselves
peaceably, and as good subjects of the commonwealth, shall be
equally under the protection of the law; and no subordination of
any sect or denomination to another shall ever be established by
law.").
14. Minnesota. MINN. CON. art. I, § 16 (" . . . nor shall . . .any
preference be given by law to any religious establishment or mode
of worship... ").
15. Mississippi. Miss. CON. art. 1, § 18 ("... no preference shall be
given by law to any religious sect or mode of worship...").
16. Missouri. Mo. CON. art. I, § 7 (". . . that no preference shall be
given to nor any discrimination made against any church, sect or
creed of religion, or any form of religious faith or worship.").
17. Nebraska. NEB. CON. art. I, § 4 ("... no preference shall be given
by law to any religious society. ..").
18. Nevada. NEV. CoN. art. I, § 4 ("The free exercise and enjoyment
of religious profession and worship without discrimination or
preference shall be forever allowed in this State...").
19. New Hampshire. N.H. CON. art. I, § VI ("... no subordination of
any one sect, denomination or persuasion to another shall ever be
established.").
nor shall any
20. New Mexico. N.M. CON. art. II, § 11 ("...
preference be given by law to any religious denomination or mode
of worship.").
21. New York. N.Y. CON. art. I, § 3 ("The free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship, with-out
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed in this State
to all mankind. ..").
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22. North Dakota. N.D. CON. art. I, § 3 ("The free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference shall be forever guaranteed in this
state. .. ").

23. Ohio. OHIO CON. art. I, § 7 ("... no preference shall be given, by
law, to any religious society...").
24. Pennsylvania. PA. CON. art. I, § 3 ("... no preference shall ever
be given by law to any religious establishments or modes of
worship.").
25. South Dakota. S.D. CON. art. VI, § 3 ("...

nor shall any

preference be given by law to any religious establishment or mode
of worship.").
26. Tennessee. TENN. CON. art. I, § 3 ("...
that no preference shall
ever be given, by law, to any religious establishment or mode of
worship.").
27. Texas. TEX. CON. art. I, § 6 ("... that no preference shall ever be
given by law to any religious society or mode of worship.").
28. Virginia. VA. CON. art. 1, § 16 ("....

the General Assembly shall

not... confer any peculiar privileges or advantages on any sect
or denomination...").
29. West Virginia. W.VA. CON. art. II, § 15 ("... the Legislature
shall not... confer any peculiar privileges or advantages on any
sect or denomination... ").
30. Wisconsin. Wis. CON. art. I, § 18("... nor shall... any preference
be given by law to any religious establishments or modes of
worship. .. ").

31. Wyoming. Wyo. CON. art. I, § 18 ("The free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship without
discrimination or preference shall be forever guaranteed in this
state. .. ").

